

able to find their way back, settled in the mountains 173
of Kūrdistan.¹

The two above described classes of Kūrds are distinguished among themselves by terms signifying respectively, "Dwellers in tents," or "Nomads," and "Labourers," or "Subjects" (*Rayahs*). 565

The peasant Kūrds are said to outnumber the 565 warriors in the proportion of four or five to one. The 614 latter are estimated at some thirteen thousand families, of whom ten thousand are nomad, the remainder 162] being settled in the towns and villages. All these 614 warrior Kūrds are divided into tribes, of which they distinguish three kinds: *ashiré* (great tribes), *quabilé* (medium tribes), and *thàifés* (small tribes). These are counted by tents or houses, each of which contains from five to twenty inmates. The great tribes are subdivided into *quabilés* and *thàifés*, or merely into *thàifés*, which term is also generally used to denote a tribe, whether great or small. The small tribes which are unconnected with an *ashiré* are called isolated *thàifés*.

The tribes, or clans, consist of the family of the 614 chief, and a number of other families more or less 621 ● closely connected with it. In their encampments the 621 tent of the chief is conspicuous among the others by its size, for it is the council chamber, court of justice, and general meeting-place of the elders of the tribe, and in it general hospitality is exercised. Clan feeling and devotion to the chief are the leading characteristics of these wild people. The head of the tribe is, however, not an arbitrary ruler, the voices of the

¹ Binder, *Au Kurdistan, ou Mésopotamie*, &c., p. 110.

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 ● 621 elders having great weight, and, as I shall subse-
 622 quently point out, even the women are not excluded
 from a share in the politics of the tribe.

175 Though more or less dominated by the numerous
 186 conquerors who have successively, for three thousand
 years, overrun those regions which are now called
 Kûrdistan, the Kûrds have never ceased to own a
 distinct nationality. Since the Ottoman conquest
 they have been constantly wavering between the two
 rival powers of Islam—the Sunnis and the Shias, as
 represented by the Turks and the Persians respectively,
 siding, according to the exigencies of the time, now
 with one party and now with the other. Notwith-
 721 standing their sufferings in the destructive wars of
 648 conquest waged for centuries by Turk and Persian,
 186 and the constant internal feuds fomented by both
 those nations in order to weaken the power of the
 Kûrdish warriors, they still maintain a sort of semi-
 independence, preserving their nationality as distinct
 from that of their neighbours as in earlier days,
 though possessing no dynasty, political constitution,
 ancient religion, historical traditions, or literature, to
 bind them together.

667 Three times during the present century have
 national aspirations incited them to throw off the
 Turkish yoke; but owing to the immense extent of
 mountainous country over which they are scattered,
 their successes have been but partial and nugatory.

101 Representatives as they probably are of the ancient
 174 Chaldeans, no other race has, perhaps, so long pre-
 served its nationality under conditions so unfavourable.

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The town of Rowanduz, as has been noted, has a population of some 3,000 persons, the constitution of which shall be dealt with later. A town of this size qualifies as a municipality (Arabic, baladiya) and the qaimmaqan of Rowanduz occupies, in addition to his own office, that of raia baladiya, a position similar to that of an American mayor, save that it is appointive rather than elective. Normally the raia baladiya in Iraq has a headquarters, comparable to the American city hall, and a staff of his own, including a treasurer and other officials. In Rowanduz, however, there has not been any particular need for the institution of such a separate body, and "metropolitan" administrative requirements are met through qadha or district facilities.

The problems presented by town administration appear to be very slight. Public order is maintained by the qadha-police and minor violations of the civil code (few of the townspeople have recourse to "tribal law") as well as legal processes are handled directly by the judge. In comparison with the outlying districts, the town is relatively law-abiding, aside from a certain amount of juvenile pilfering. Quarrels among women are quite frequent, the cause most often a fight between their children. Such skirmishes begin with words ("prostitute" is a favorite), and degenerate to hair-pulling or an exchange of blows with kabkab (a wooden sandal with a leather strap; in Arabic, qubqab or qabqab). The neighbors usually intervene, and rarely, if ever, does such a thing require official attention. Fighting between men is infrequent, but can become

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although the Israeli is universally despised, brought a decline in the variety and quality of craftsmanship in Rowanduz freely confessed and regretted by the townspeople.

A man who now wishes to purchase such things as gold jewelry for his wife must travel to Erbil.

It must be admitted that the strength of the town as a center based on village trade is precarious, and much of the commercial activity with importance in district economy has been replaced by service to the government personnel and the several wealthy landowners who reside within it. In brief, the economic realignments of the first World War have changed the bases of the size and importance of Rowanduz. Once these were primarily commercial, and only secondarily political, while today a reversal of this position has taken place. The increased influence of the government, which is a matter of numbers, into everyday life has introduced into the town a new income without whose supplement Rowanduz might have experienced certain decline.

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upper class in the second system, is unnecessary for this group. Ra'uf Effendi, for example, cannot read or write, although he can sign his name and speaks four languages fluently. It is with these "gentle" commoners that there is intermarriage among the aristocracy, although commoners can never attain the rank of a chieftain. The bases of the class are either wealth or literacy. A halla can be extremely poor and still enjoy the distinction. It might be mentioned that the lowest class of civil servants, the clerks, as well as Christians and Jews, if wealthy, are addressed by the same term elsewhere in Iraq. A teacher, however, does not always like to be called effendi because he has had a college or university education, and, no matter how poorly paid, belongs to the educated upper class of the second system.

Rowanduz is non-tribal and does not, as a whole, owe allegiance to any particular chieftain, although the House of Isma'il Beg owns a great part of the town. "We do not belong to tribes," Ra'uf Effendi explained, "although perhaps our ancestors did, but we have no knowledge of them." Persons of the lower classes, transients or migrants from the villages, may, of course, retain such affiliations. In Ottoman times, Rowanduz enjoyed an independence, just as it does today, from tribal or feudal obligations. The wealthy merchants of the town, particularly those engaged in the lucrative caravan trade with Iran, were called chalebis, another Turkish term for "gentlemen,"

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advice or would their employers.

Commoners make up nine-tenths or more of the population of the town. They are, of course, Kurds, and Kurdish is their primary tongue. A number of the older men speak Turkish and Persian, although these are now disappearing, and almost everyone commands a few words of Arabic. Their clothing is in the native style. Their relations with the officials and officers are much more extensive than those of the aristocrats, because many are employed by the government personnel, and are, on the whole, amicable, depending on the personality of the official in question. It has been seen that the doctor and one of the police officers were heartily disliked. It is interesting that officials are referred to much as the local aristocracy. Colonel Khalid Raqshbandi, an aristocrat by birth, was not addressed as officer, but simply as "Khalid Rag," a commander of the "government tribe."

Among themselves, the townspeople are governed to some extent by their mutayy, Ra'uf Effendi, and by public opinion. It must be remembered, however, that this is a population of diverse origins, made up of families of the Ottoman town, newcomers from other Kurdish cities, such as Sulaymaniye, and of migrants and transients from the villages. Thus there is little of the solidarity to be found in an agricultural village. It has been noted that there is no mandatory communal labor, such as helping a man build his house, but rather optional neighborhood cooperation. For the townspeople there is no participation in

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government, and no civic or charitable organizations, guilds, or clubs. The diwankhana of the aristocrat, as noted, is often used as a men's clubhouse and a sort of village center, but that of Isma'il Beg in the town is rarely so used, and the mosque or the shaykhanas offer little as substitutes. In Rowandux there is thus an aggregate of separate households whose relationships with the government and with each other are largely on an individual basis, and for social life a man depends to a great extent on his relatives and friends. This should not be taken to mean that there is no force to public opinion or community interest. A mutual concern is much in evidence in the public conduct of individuals and in festivals, and a large part of this is furnished by the Muslim faith. In the summer of 1951 a collection was taken up among the townspeople as a pious work for a poor Arab, arrested by the police as a suspected deserter from the army and subsequently released penniless. The effect of public opinion in such matters as the wearing of the veil or smoking on the streets during Ramadan has already been noticed. The distribution of food and clothing to the poor of the town on certain occasions, and other examples of a similar nature, will be encountered in later sections. However, there is no structural bond or concrete rules of membership which cause the townspeople to act as a whole, although such behavior can often be observed.

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Rowanduz, as a minor administrative and mercantile center, stands almost midway between the agricultural village and the great city. Its populace is divided into three groups, the Kurdish aristocrats, the townsmen, and the official class. It is here, rather than in the villages, that the displacement of the aristocracy is more clearly in evidence. In Ottoman times the divisions of society were stabilized. There was little motive or means for the son of a townsman to become a civil servant, although this occasionally took place, and it was impossible, as it still is, to become an aristocrat. The addition of the officials and officers of modern Iraq, a "new elite," and, in particular, the institution of schools which makes entrance possible, has radically altered this arrangement. It is now theoretically within the reach of any townsman to have a son enter the ranks of the official class, and it is for this reason that they insist so avidly on the education of their heirs, placing high hopes on their success in the schools. Strictly speaking, the society of the town is disjointed, for the townsmen continue to regard the official class as alien, and have adopted little of their dress and manners. On the other hand, they have been quick to realize that the new system offers an opportunity for social advancement and are eager for their children to take advantage of it. In short, the townspeople have been absorbed into the second system, although the first continues to operate elsewhere in the district,

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as in the case of Mahmud Beg of the Baradost who rules
as did his forebears, and must be counted as a factor in
everyday life. It is thus that one finds a duality of
thought and behavior as far as the two aristocracies are
concerned. A landowner in Rowanduz spoke of the chieftains
as though they were the only important element in society
and, at the same time, alternately praised and castigated
two of his sons for their respective success and failure
in school. The youth who had failed was regarded as a
great disappointment, a condemnation which would not have
occurred fifty years ago when the upper echelons of society
were either inaccessible or unconnected with the prestige
and power of the new servants of the state.

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their own brothers and sisters was known. The impression 582
the investigator obtained from all of these things was that 596
the patrilineage, expressed in the mal or "house," strongly
overrode the lateral calculation of relations to extend or
broaden the kinship group. Marriages undertaken for 581
economic or social advantage add to the divergency, inas-
much as they bring together at one point unrelated groups.
It must be remembered, however, that Rowanduz was re-
settled from various sources after its destruction in the
first World War, and the marriages of its families, many
of them migrants to the town, cannot be expected to show
the characteristics of a similar community whose popula-
tion had been left undisturbed. In the agricultural 621
villages of the district, it was said, somewhat arbitrarily, 602
that "everyone is related," but one suspects, in view of the 571
importance of the patrilineage and the form of inheritance,
that even in these places marriages characteristically
cause divergence in forming new family or mal-groups, and
the village population is constantly regrouping, rather
than constituting a systematically interrelated whole.

The Kurdish kinship nomenclature, as recorded at 601
Rowanduz, makes systematic use of a limited number of
basic terms. The first group of these, twelve in number,
indicate consanguineal relationships, those held to be
in the "milk" of the mother or in the "blood:"

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|------------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1. <u>Ba pir</u> | ("Old Father") | Grandfather |
| 2. <u>Ma pir</u> | ("Old Mother") | Grandmother |
| 3. <u>Ba</u> | ("Father") | Father |
| 4. <u>Ma</u> | ("Mother") | Mother |

[Text continues on page 237]

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the Jaf confederacy of nomadic as well as sedentary tira. The following discussion will, for the sake of simplicity, relate only to the Hamawanda, an independent tira of population ca. 1000-1500, which became sedentary some two or three generations ago.

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The lineage organization has two main areas of relevance: land ownership, and defence and offence in war. Property rights to land and grazing area are held jointly by the tira as a whole; exclusive usufruct rights are vested in its localized segments, inhabiting compact villages with a population of 50 to 200 individuals. Within the village territory, men have traditional rights to certain fields. These rights are passed on from father to son, but are not inalienable, and land is freely redistributed by the village council when the need arises. If a segment becomes extinct, its territory passes as normal inheritance to the other segments of the lineage, according to the degrees of kinship (on any one level of segmentation, "brothers" exclude "cousins" from inheritance).

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Further, until successful pacification in 1932, the lineage was, and still is potentially, also a military unit, mobilized in toto if a segment were attacked from without, and divided in opposition according to the segmentary charter when conflicts arose within the group. Conflicts relating to territorial rights were rife, both within, where they led to fission, and without, where they led to conquest or loss of territory.

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There is a clear contrast between the Kurdish and most African systems in the readiness with which the problems of fission and fusion are solved. A man's rights to land are limited to the territory of the village segment of his lineage; a stranger or a person from another lineage segment is accepted into a village only as hired farm help ("sapani") of degraded status. The territorial exclusiveness of lineage segments thus tends to be maintained to high degree, and there are no kinship mechanisms for developing "attached" lineages with local territorial and political rights.⁷ The segmentary nature of the maximal lineage expresses itself directly in geographical distribution, and the respective territories of major and minor segments, inhabited nearly exclusively by them, down to the village level, can be plotted on a map or clearly seen where one has a view of the valley bottom. The main integrative factors relevant to segments larger than the village seem to be territorial contiguity, knowledge of common descent, and the importance of the tira as a defensive unit—this last probably being of most weight. No religious or ritual

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⁷ A permanent relationship may occasionally be established between a conquering lineage group and a conquered, non-tribal peasant population, who retain certain rights as surfs of the ruling lineage. In these cases, a caste barrier is set up, preventing intermarriage between the two groups. This relationship, observed on the northern margins of Hamawanda territory, does not seem to be very stable.

183 Where the cost of marrying an unrelated, "stranger" girl is so high and the normative preference for near kin clear, the inducement for the young man to seek a bride among his cousins is evident. Consequently, the young men make the "right" choice though they appear subjectively to feel, and invariably express the opinion, that they are entirely free to seek any bride they might wish. The problem in this situation centers around what the motivation of the girl's father is, that he should forego his right to a brideprice which, to the Kurdish farmer, constitutes a minor fortune. Or put somewhat differently, the central problem is: what are the advantages gained in this system by giving one's daughter to a brother's son which compensate one for the loss of the brideprice.

613 The answer would seem to lie in the political structure. In the Kurdish lineage
571 system, all groups are subject to a constant pressure towards segmentation and fission, unmodulated by the interlocking circles of identification normally associated
621 with segmentary descent systems (among the Nuer, territorial vs. descent groups, cross-cutting age-grades; among Tallensi, further the ritual collaboration between
665 lineages, etc.). This pressure is painfully evident in factional activity within the
604 villages, and emerges in all first-hand descriptions of Kurdish life.⁹ Kurdish vil-
582 lages are characterized by a constant struggle for political power on the part of a majority of the adult men, at times even women. Such political power is proportional to the number of riflemen one can mobilize to support one's claims. In a patrilineal lineage system, a man can expect political support only from his agnatic relatives, those who by descent belong to his political sub-section; and the factions in the village tend to be alignments of the younger men of a small lineage segment around an older leader. These segments consist primarily of brothers, sons, and brothers' sons. The relation to the latter is most critical: it crosses the first potential line of cleavage between collateral branches. If a man alienates his nephews by refusing them their traditional rights, he loses their political support. If he, on the other hand, gives them his daughters in marriage, the ties are reinforced and lineage solidarity maintained. The girl's father creates an obligation on the part of his brother's son to give him political support by exempting him from paying the
[583] brideprice. No other son-in-law can, in the lineage system, fill this role as political supporter; consequently they must invariably pay brideprice. The transaction may thus be regarded as constituting a type of delayed exchange: the father receives political allegiance in his lifetime from his brother's son in return for the daughter which he gives him. In this way, the pattern of preferential father's brother's

[182] ⁹ E.g. C. J. Rich, *Narrative of a Residence in Kurdistan* (London, 1836); H. B. Sasse, *Through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise* (London, 1926); Hay, *op. cit.*
daughter marriage serves to reinforce the political implications of the lineage system.

MARRIAGE IN KURDISTAN

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daughter marriage serves to reinforce the political implications of the lineage system.

If this view is generally correct, one would expect to find a high frequency of father's brother's daughter marriage associated with a developed lineage organization in the Middle East, and the frequencies to be appreciably lower in villages with a different type of organization. In the southern Kurdish area, this is clearly so: for other areas, the literature gives no conclusive evidence.

In the southern Kurdish feudally organized territory, neighboring on the above discussed Hamawand territory, the comparative picture might be summarized as follows: (1) The expressed norms are modified, though not basically changed. First rights of paternal cousins are not as strongly emphasized, and the ideal of equality between spouses tends to be interpreted in terms of village endogamy rather than with reference to descent group. (2) Brideprices tend to be lower for all categories of husbands, especially those of the local community (this holds true for the villages, not for the larger towns, where great variations in class and wealth intervene); some villages have made formal agreements that no brideprice should be charged within the village unit. An alternative and moderately popular way of avoiding brideprice is the sister exchange between two indifferently related men. (3) The actual frequency of father's brother's daughter marriage clearly drops, while village endogamy (in villages generally larger than those with a lineage organization) remains high. A complete census of marriages in one such non-tribal village may serve as an example:

Fa and Mo						Total
FaBrDa (amooza)	MoBrDa (khalooza)	SiDa (purza)	Other relative	Unrelated in village	Other village	
6	1	1	9	19	10	46

This picture would seem to be consistent with the views expressed above.

Hilma Granqvist¹⁰ gives some comparable material from an Arab village in Palestine, where the local community is divided into patrilineal descent groups, called clans, apparently of a segmentary type; but where several of these descent groups reside together in a large village, and have no wider political or territorial importance. She offers the following frequencies of degree of relationship between spouses in one village:¹¹

¹⁰ Hilma Granqvist, *Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village* (Helsingfors, 1931).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 92, 194-197.



Fig. 12. The tobacco field is ploughed with oxen. Toprawa.

276 Tobacco is not fermented. So far as I could discover the pulverized tobacco cannot be rolled for cigarettes, but is poured by hand into cigarette-sized paper tubes ending in a cardboard cylinder. These paper tubes, inserted in each other and collected in large packets, are purchased at the *sig* in the town. They are placed in vertical groups on metal trays. The filling of the paper casings with pulverized tobacco is woman's work. (Tobacco sample: E. 2245).

562 Woman's world, like man's, is subject to the social structure of the village.

491 The villages I had an opportunity of visiting belonged to an *agha*⁶⁴ or squire⁶⁵. He had no need to live in the village, for he could, for example, have resided in Sulaimani on the Surchin plain⁶⁶. Incidentally the owner of a village could be a woman managing the property for a son who had not reached his majority, as was the case with Lady Adila's daughter-in-law, who at the time I met her was living at Sulaimani. It was said that she owned "many villages and watercourses". If the owner of a village did not dwell on his property he had in the village, according to Leach⁶⁷, a manager "kokha", to represent him. A village owner could be of the same family as his tenants or farmers, in which event relations were purely tribal. In cases I was able to investigate in Toprawa, Rakawa,

[566] Sargalu and Serkan the sheikhs were not related to the inhabitants and conditions were feudal. The


The village scene

Fig. 13. Village houses built up the slope. Topzawa.

owner of the village leased the ground to his farmers and none could sell, move away or move in without his sanction⁶⁸. Tenants owned their cattle, their implements and the only part of the house construction that was of value, the big poplar trunks that were used as rafters.

According to information obtained through my interpreter, tenants handed over 50% of the tobacco crop and 10% of all other crops, besides ploughing, harvesting and threshing for the village owner⁶⁹. On another occasion the interpreter gave the amount as 50% of both wheat and tobacco. However this information must be taken with reserve. Edmonds⁷⁰ gives 10% of the winter crop—wheat and barley—plus fees for grazing, butter and eggs. Leach⁷¹ states 50% if the tenant himself supplies the seeds and possesses agricultural implements, but 75% if the owner of the village has to supply these.

During the British mandate period, 1918–1932, the Land Settlement Commission was established as “a court of claims relating to questions of land tenure” in connexion with a “comprehensive program” of surveying for the purpose of covering systematically all cultivated land and finally “settle and register proprietary rights”⁷². A representative of this commission held a meeting with farmers in the sheikh’s courtyard at Serkan during my stay there.

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INTRODUCTION

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[367] Scattered over the South Kurdish countryside are a great number of small, compact villages, essentially similar in their physical aspects, yet highly variegated with respect to their composition and organization, ranging from extended lineage organizations to fully developed feudal organization. Thus, on the village level, there is a great diversity of forms of social organization. Yet the *culture* of the area seems essentially uniform, and these alternative principles of organization are universally known. In the recent history of some villages, there has been a rapid, fundamental change from one type of social organization to another. In the following, an attempt will be made to discuss these various types of organization as they express themselves in the actual power hierarchy of individuals in the village. The discussion will thus be directed towards discovering what types of social categories exist, what actual powers each category entails, and which of these categories are found in harmonious conjunction — since some of the categories that belong in different basic frameworks of social organization are, as might be expected, mutually exclusive in any local community.

177 It seems probable that a fluid and complex situation of this type is characteristic of societies which lie in the shatter zone between larger culture areas — in this case, between the Arab, Persian, and Turkish. Such a location produces familiarity with various competing normative systems, principles of organization, and power hierarchies. This familiarity on the part of the villager leads to attempts at

stable, and official administration, directed from Baghdad, grew in scope and progressively enlarged its area of effective control. 175

Such then is the background of the villages where the following material was collected. They are primarily tenant villages in the Suleimani valley, or villages dominated by freeholding Hamawand farmers. However, certain aspects of local social structure become clear only by comparison with other situations — particularly those found in the *Jaf* areas — or by historical comparisons and deductions. The data on Jaf organization was obtained from a limited number of informants on short visits to various villages. For historical material, C. J. Rich's accounts (op.cit) have been found most useful. [114] 177

I have tried to avoid bringing conditions and factors in the towns of Suleimani, Chemchemal, Halebja, etc. into the picture. The numerous «Western» influences in these centers are extremely complicated and difficult to evaluate. In the intricacies of the class and near-caste system, differential contacts and reactions due to sub-cultures are indeed complex. The rural areas, on the other hand, show greater uniformity in patterns: the tribal areas are organized and separable, and the tenant villagers, in their small, endogamous communities, have strong patterns of localism and traditionalism. There is a popular story illustrating this localism: A donkey belonging to one of the tenant farmers in a village ran away; so the farmer followed it, to catch it. The donkey climbed up the hillside, far away from the village, but the farmer did not want to lose it. So he followed it high up into the mountains, never turning, and finally close to the mountain top he caught it. On turning around he saw below him the whole beautiful Shahr-i-zur plain, in which his own village lay. The peasant gasped and exclaimed: «I never knew the world was so vast!» 177 621 • 186

What goes on in the towns belongs, as far as most villagers are concerned, to a quite separate world, and it seemed both in the field and in working up the notes valid to separate off the Kurdish countryside as the area of study. But due to diversity even in this area, any attempt at giving a conventional anthropological description of «the culture» of «the society» must fail. Each of the compact, widely separated little villages shows characteristics of its own, local 621

621 permutations of pan-Kurdish institutions, or traits derived from the specific setting and history of the particular village.

621 No one of these villages, however, is self-contained. Though each
619 shows a high degree of self-sufficiency and endogamy, it is tied to others in a web of social relations, embracing the whole of Southern Kurdistan. Many institutions affecting large districts have their main focus in one or another of these local villages, not visibly different from the next: the home village of the leader of the derwish brotherhood, that of a tribal leader, a rich landowner, a locally important mullah. Ordinary trade ties village to village and village to city; illegal tobacco trade follows back roads and high mountain passes in a web of its own. Thus no village is self-contained or separable in structural terms. Clearly, a larger unit of study than any one village is needed.

But as soon as one proceeds beyond the village level, complications arise. Social relations within the village are virtually continuous, and a constant set of relations and hierarchy of organization persists, or changes only slowly. Relations outside the village, on the other hand, are discontinuous. In such relations, there is a stronger tendency to press any immediate advantage to the limit. To this end, the individual attempts to manipulate a variety of competing institutions and norms, derived from tribal Kurdish, purely local, Arabic, Islamic, Persian, «modern» etc. cultural contexts. On the other hand, to give these relations the degree of permanence that they do have, some generally accepted principle must exist, or the social relations would break down (as they in fact do in the case of feud). — An attempt will be made to unravel the institutionalized forms that these inter-village relations take.

The internal organization of the village presents problems of a different kind. The great differences between villages make it meaningless to construct an average «typical» or «modal» type of village organization. They may be classified according to type, the basic dichotomy being between those of freeholding, tribally organized farmers, and those of non-tribal, sharecropping tenants. But rather than construct an arbitrary number of types, it seems more fertile to exploit the existing diversity to discover co-variance of

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

institutional forms: Thereby the structural connections between various institutions and principles of organization should become clearer. It will be found that the principles that serve to organize the village are to large extent the same as those which are applied in the more inclusive systems of organization.

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614 list, the Benadjut are such a branch, which has split off from the parent, Shaikh 'Smail *tira*. The Shatri group of *tiras*, on the other hand, are all «sons of one father», and no one of the *tiras* takes precedence. Such groups have more than mere legendary unity. Firstly, as «brothers», they have the right of inheritance to each others' pastures and campsites, in the case of one of the *tiras* dying out. There is also a minimum of political co-ordination: In the case of war or other far-reaching decisions, the leaders of all Shatri *tiras* meet in a council. So that no one of them should have an advantage, this council meets in the tent of a rich follower, *not* in the tent of any one *Raiz*. The council reaches agreement by discussion, and has, as a body, no formal powers.

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• 621 **KHEL.** Though the *tira* holds grazing rights in common, it will rarely camp in one unit, but generally divides into several separate tentcamps, each called a *kbel*. The *kbel* may vary in size and composition, but may roughly be regarded as a lineage segment. It is, however, held together by economic as well as lineage ties. Hired shepherds etc. may thus belong to a specific *kbel* without being members of the *Jaf ashiret*, or economic partnership between persons of different lineage segments may temporarily influence *kbel* membership. The *kbel* is led by an older man, more or less informally elected or granted authority because he is the person with the greatest power and prestige. The *kbel* is thus primarily a residence unit, and is less permanent in its composition than the larger units which are based on descent only.

592 **HOUSEHOLDS.** Each *kbel* in turn is made up of a number of households, frequently some 20—30, each inhabiting a separate tent. The households seem to have roughly the same size and composition as those of the sedentary village Kurds, described above. If a father can afford the necessary expenses in tent and utensils, he will set up an independent household for his married son. Poor people, on the other hand, may find this impossible. — Marriage is preferably with FaBrDa or other close relative, very rarely outside the *tira*. Brideprice varies from £ 200 to occasionally nothing in the case of close relatives. Payment may take any form, either in kind or cash, but is computed in terms of money.

Self-

565 respecting men should not engage in economic pursuits, their main
 461 role was formerly that of warriors, protecting the people and flocks
 554 from attacks by other groups. Only the very poor herded their own
 cattle. Where one person does not own enough animals to make up
 the normal herding unit of 500, composite herds are created along
 kinship lines, with father, brother, *mam*, etc. Differences in wealth
 are tremendous, apparently on a continuous scale, some persons
 owning a total of 2,000 animals, some as few as 50, some quite
 destitute and dependent on richer relatives for subsistence and work.

- 621 With the tendency towards parallel cousin marriage, every group
 614 tends to split up into separate lineages, which continue separate over
 long periods of time. Thus semi-endogamous sections are created
 within the *tira* itself, usually identified with separate *kbel*s. But
 since the *kbel* is a residential unit, the main unity of which stems
 from economic ties, persons of any lineage section may travel for
 longer or shorter periods with any *kbel* to which their economic
 activities might attach them. Generally, one of these semi-endogamous
 lineage sections will form the wealthy core of a *kbel*, to which a
 more or less variable group of less privileged families, related or not,
 are connected by economic ties.

622 These endogamous tendencies are also operative in the family of
 614 the *Raiz*. The position as *Raiz* is inherited, and the family of the
 581 *Raiz* therefore takes on the appearance of a noble class or caste. The
 process by which such a caste would truly emerge, however, would
 be through intermarriage with the «noble» lineage segments of other
tiras. There seem in fact to be few such kinship ties established
 between *Raiz* families of different groups. A certain number of
 marriages will be exogamous as far as the *Raiz* family is concerned,
 if only from the occasional lack of available spouses in the limited
 family group. But these exogamous marriages more frequently estab-
 lish ties between the *Raiz* and wealthy lineage segments among the
 «commoners» within the *tira* itself. It would thus seem that marri-
 ages are manipulated to reinforce the power of the *Raiz* within the
tira itself, rather than to separate him off as a member of a distinc-
 tive and noble caste. To reify a distinction between «nobleman» and
 «commoner» within the *tira* would thus be an error, since the separa-

643 chard, 1949). The presence of the Jaf *Begzada* as political heads
 642 necessarily affects the internal organization of the various Jaf *tiras*,
 and the segmentary nature of the lineage organization is therefore
 not expressed fully. Each *Rais* becomes de-facto vested with some
 authority as the representative of the permanently established Jaf
Begzada, and the political structure is thus actually a compromise
 between a truly segmentary lineage organization and a hierarchical
 organization.

642 As far as its formal structure goes, the Jaf confederacy seems
 extremely similar to the political system of the early Mongols, as
 described e. g. by Hudson: The prominence of Chengish Khan's
 lineage is phrased by him in terms of the vassalization of other
 descent groups, to emphasize that «all the subjects of the Khan were
 considered as the vassals not of the ruler but of his family and his
 close kinsmen as represented by him» (op. cit., p. 92). Essentially the
 same might well be said if the relation between the *tiras* of the Jaf
 confederacy and their *Begzada* lineage. It is interesting to speculate
 whether, since the political mechanism seems to be present, it was
 merely the difficulties of topography that prevented the Jaf and
 similar Kurdish confederacies from forming the larger units that one
 finds in the Central Asian steppe area.

642 The immediate modification in Jaf formal structure made necess-
 • 621 ary by the adoption of sedentary life and agriculture are slight,
 178 thought the meanings and importance attaching to the various
 aspects of the organization change radically. Generally, each *kbel*
 settles in a part of the old *tira* pastures, and the informal head of
 the *kbel* becomes the formally elected *kikba* (mayor or headman)
 of the resulting village. Any one *tira* thus tends to split up com-
 pletely, some *kbel*s settling at the winter camp sites around Qizil
 Rubat, others 80 km. N.E. on the autumn campsites of Shahr-i-zur.
 Whereas tribal unity thus loses its significance, each village is regis-
 tered as the property of one or another of the *Begzada*, and Jaf identi-
 fication, as well as the acceptance of *Begzada* leadership, is natural.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF TENANT VILLAGES

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The political organization of the non-tribal areas is generally much simpler, unifying a much smaller group. Immediately above the village level, external administration takes over control. In the village itself, a *kikba* or *gaskbêr* (mayor, headman) is elected to serve as an intermediary between the people of the village and the authorities. Frequently he is appointed from above rather than freely elected, in an attempt to achieve a balance of power within the village. In the official governmental system, the *kikba* of the village is the official of the smallest unit. A hierarchy of officers, appointed from above in the bureaucratic system, administers progressively more inclusive areas, terminating in the bureaucratic head, the *Mutasarriff* of the *Liw* (governor of the province), directly responsible to the government ministries, and with considerable autonomy. In practice, however, the landowner of the village intervenes at the base of this hierarchy, and the *kikba* serves as an intermediary between the villagers and the landowner, and has few dealings directly with official administration.

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• 621

When left to their own devices, the villagers generally elect to office the older male leader of the largest kinship group. As a consequence of the marriage pattern, such kinship groups tend to separate off as endogamous blocks. But due to the lower frequency of FaBrDa marriage among the non-tribal villagers (see p. 68), these blocks show less organization and unity than the endogamous subsections in the tribal system, and could not properly be called lineages. Furthermore, they tend to be bilateral, in the sense that relationships traced through female links attain some importance. The relative sizes of these bilateral kinship blocks change fairly slowly, so village headmanship, as well as leadership in the kinship groups, tends to follow an apparently hereditary pattern from father to son.

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The powers of the *kikba* derive in part from his powers as the head of such a group, in part from his closer relations with the landowner, and the implicit threat of reporting illegalities (or in fact making false accusations) to him. As the leader of the village,

he also exercises certain rights in his relations with the landowner — 622
he can e. g. exclude any newcomer from village membership.

Among the various villages in an area, or those belonging to one 621 •
landowner, there is no attempt at coordination. My host owns
among others, the three neighboring villages Hazar Merd, Decon,
and Darbaro in the Suleimani valley. These villages share, for historical
reasons, the usufruct rights to the surrounding area. Rather than
making any attempt at concerted action in matters concerning them
all, e. g. by meetings of the village headmen, there exists considerable
enmity between the three villages. A marriage between the son of 581
the *kikhs* of Decon and the daughter of the leading family of Hazar
Merd does not seem to have had any «political» results, and was
probably manipulated to enhance the prestige of the *kikhs* and his
son in their own village.

GENERAL FEATURES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The application of these formal political organizations, both of 554
the lineage and feudal types, is modified by one basic principle,
namely, the universal application of status difference, and the resulting
lack of conceptualization of «the office», as apart from the
total person occupying it at any one moment. An example might
illustrate the point: Upon my arrival in the village of Decon, a small
group of workmen were engaged in laying a brick floor in the local
house of my host, the landowner. In their social classification of me,
the only criterion available to them was the fact of my being his
guest; so I enjoyed a reflection of his high status position, and consequently
found myself in a relation of super-ordination with respect
to the workmen. They found it necessary to interrupt their work
unasked to perform personal services for me, e. g. serving me my
tea, etc. The workmen, brought to the village for the sole purpose of
laying the brick floor, had no feeling that theirs was only a part-role
in the situation, where they were expected to perform a specific
service and no more. The status of bricklayers is clearly inferior to
that of friend-of-the-landowner; the fact that their contact was by
virtue of their office as bricklayers did not release them from universal
sub-ordination to the occupier of higher status. Wherever a

727 A Hamawand Agba, normally a close relative of the leader of the
 622 warparty, would be appointed to the conquered village. He would
 settle permanently in the village with a small group of Hamawand
 supporters. What remained of the local taxes after their immediate
 needs were satisfied would be passed on to the Agba leader of the
 original party.

668 Conflicts easily arose between the Hamawand usurper and his
 original backer. As soon as the balance of power changed in favor
 of the former, and he further felt that he would be able to control
 the conquered village with his own forces, he would declare himself
 independent and thereby found a new lineage branch.

It may seem surprising that the smaller group in such a village
 should be successful in forcibly dominating the larger group for any
 length of time. As far as the conquest itself is concerned, the point
 was clearly made to me by the leader of one group of subjected serfs:
 «In those days, people were so busy with their farms and things,
 they had no time to be ready with guns and horses. Those who had
 enough money to feed the man that ride around on horses could
 conquer such poor villages.» And later, although the local Hama-
 wands may have declared themselves independent of their old village,
 they could still count on support from their fellow tribesmen in case
 of revolt. The peasants, on the other hand, had no organization inte-
 grating a larger group. Furthermore, it is the peasant group who has
 the vested interest in peace, so that the crop can ripen and the stores
 survive. In case of conflict, the Hamawands risked only the loss of
 an asset, whereas the peasants, no matter what the outcome might
 be, were practically assured the loss of their whole year's crop.

• 621 The local group that emerged from these conquests has a very
 622 characteristic structure and organization. Except where external
 administration intervenes effectively, all political power is in the
 hands of a well organized Hamawand minority, led by an hereditary
 Agba. This ruling group has vested interests in remaining separate
 from the remainder of the village, and the close tribal organization
 limited by descent provides the necessary mechanism.

421 This political dominance serves primarily to enforce certain privi-
 651 leges in the economic field. The Hamawands regard themselves as

42/ the owners of the land, and collect as tax the traditionally stipulated
 65/ fraction of the peasants' crop: $1/3$ — $1/10$ of the cereal crop, $1/3$ of the irrigated crop, where such is grown. Usually the Hamawand section of the village is too large to live entirely on these taxes, and since raiding activities are no longer possible (at least not on any scale, though they are still accused especially of cattle-theft by their neighbors), they find it necessary to contribute to subsistence by farming. The Hamawand farmers hold land as private, inheritable property. They recognize the rights of sons of non-tribal peasants to inherit the usufruct rights to specific fields from their fathers, but where the situation permits, such rights may easily be infringed upon.

- 62/ A third group is also usually present in the village, consisting of laborers, generally of «foreign» origin. This group is in a similar economic position to that of laborers in the ordinary peasant village, with the exception that upward mobility is virtually impossible. Neither of the two conflicting groups, the Hamawand or the subjected Mankja, are willing to weaken their position by transferring the rights on land to any outside group, and the laborer can therefore never procure the necessary land to rise to tenant farmer status, even when given the economic means.

The economic conflict between the Hamawand and the Mankja is more bitter now than before external administration pacified the area. Formerly, the relation was more nearly one of symbiosis. The peasants, by being attached to a militarily powerful tribe, were in fact protected from the raids of other war-parties in return for the tax they paid. Furthermore, they benefited from the raids of their Hamawand lords by serving as intermediaries in realizing the value of the loot. The Hamawandi themselves could not enter the Bazaar of the towns, for fear of being recognized. The peasants, on the other hand, were free to enter the markets and sell the goods — for a consideration. If their war-lords were at all successful, the income from such transactions might well more than balance the rental tax paid on the farmland.

As a result of the persistent tensions between the two groups, and the clear difference in status position, very little, if any, inter-

marriage taken place. The marriage exchanges with respect to the 621 •
 close kinship group — few in any case — will among the Ham-
 wands be with Hamwands of other villages. Thus a caste separation




Diagram No. 1. Organization of composite village.

trade to grow up, separating the Hamwand effectively from the
 Makhja group, and the composition of the local group might be
 schematically represented as in diagram No. 1.

One of the composite Hamwand- Makhja villages was studied
 briefly. However, due to increased tensions connected with the app-

21 reaching review of their case in the Land Settlement Commission¹), when claims and counter-claims would come to a head, it was impossible to obtain detailed census material.

The village in question was conquered some 40 years ago by a segment of the Hamawand Hamawands, and lies at present on the very edge of Hamawand territory. Villages to the north of it, formerly under Hamawand control, have lately torn themselves loose.

The total population is ca. 100 individuals; of them, 5—6 households are Hamawand, 15—20 households Meskij, subjected tenants, and there are a few families of laborers. The Hamawand faction is led by an Agha; the Meskij are led by the *Asid* (official headman of the village). The latter is descended from the former headman, and was elected by the majority of the villagers, so in the face of government approval, the Hamawands had to accept him. Between these factions there has been no intermarriage.

The conflict in this village is related to that in the neighboring village, to which, according to the Meskij version, the Hamawands wish to extend their privileges. The balance of power between the two factions seems at present to be quite labile. The Meskij have been gaining ground through a slowly rising standard of living whereby rifles and ammunition have become increasingly available to them, and through the growing mediating effects of external administration. To fully understand the present tensions, one rule of the Land Settlement Commission which is to review ownership claims shortly should be noted: Where conflicting claims are advanced, any party who has for the last 10 years regularly collected tax on the land is regarded as the *de-facto* owner. It is thus vital for the Hamawands to retain their power, and for the Meskij to break that power, before the Land Settlement Commission arrives on the spot.

578 To this end, the factions are mobilizing all available mechanisms.

¹) The Land Settlement Commission, established during the British mandatory period, is a court of claims relating to questions of land tenure. Coordinated with a comprehensive program of mapping, its object is systematically to cover all agricultural land, and definitively settle and register proprietary rights (cf. Dawson 1931).

Unless a certain sum of money is paid, all young male citizens of 578 Iraq are liable to two years of military training and service. This is 621 • much resented by most villagers, and they attempt to avoid being called up. According to the *Meskjis*, the Hamawands have an arrangement with the police whereby they give the names of all *Meskjis* men in the two village who are liable for such service, in return for being left in peace themselves. Thus, it is said, the fighting strength of the *Meskjis* is constantly kept down.

The *Meskjis*, on the other hand, are accused of manipulating the religious brotherhood of Derwishes for political purpose, so as to organize all the *Meskjis* of the neighboring villages in a movement of resistance. To counteract this influence, the Hamawand *Agbe* is at pains to expose the derwishes as fraudulent, and attempts to enhance the position of the local mullah, the recognized leader of the local mosque. — The final verdict, however, rests with the Land Settlement Commission, an institution the integrity of which few persons choose to question.

The rigidity of the Kurdish tribal system is here clearly illustrated, 171 and might profitably be contrasted to that of the Nuer, as described 619 by Evans-Pritchard (1940). The Nuer have, in spite of extensive conquests and various vicissitudes, retained a system of patrilineal exogamous lineages as the basis of their political organization. These lineages however are not corporate localized groups, but are conceptually identified with certain areas, where they tend to form the organizing core of the local villages. Through a system of adoption of conquered Dinka tribesmen to specific lineages, and by reckoning descent through females, a larger community is built around this core, based on «sociological» kinship. Among the Kurds, on the other 619 hand, the general practice of FaNDe marriage and other close family endogamy makes any initial *reapprochement* impossible between conqueror and conquered, and encourages caste separation. Furthermore, kinship through female links is given no political recognition. The principle of «sociological» kinship is unfamiliar and would be in conflict with Islamic doctrine — the kinship terminology describes actual, genealogical distance, and practices of adoption into lineages would be unacceptable. The only way two groups could fuse in the

Chapter III.

- A. Kinship composition and organization of local groups.
- B. The blood feud.

KINSHIP COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GROUPS

The important dichotomy between tribal and non-tribal villages has been touched upon previously, and the actual differences in the formal political organization have been outlined. The following table (No. 3) attempts to illustrate co-variation between the type of formal political organization and the frequency of certain marriage patterns, resulting in a contrast in the kinship composition of local groups. In the limited period of fieldwork, and due to local difficulties in connection with land tenure and military training, it was not feasible to collect extensive census materials; and the table should serve as an illustration of a point, the validity of which was checked more extensively by less exact means, and does not pretend in itself to be statistically conclusive.

A further comment should be made to justify the separation of tribal vs. non-tribal frequencies in the «tribal» village of Koni Sard. The non-tribal category is made up of recent immigrant families, largely born or even married in other villages, and does not truly belong in the table as representative of Koni Sard.

The generalization that seems to hold for all the villages which were investigated would be: A contrast exists between the frequency

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581 of cousin marriage in tribal as compared to non-tribal villages, high frequencies of cousin marriage being associated with a *tribal* political system, that is, with the lineage type organization. General village endogamy, on the other hand, remains high in the non-tribal villages, marriages exogamous with respect to the village having similar low frequencies in both groups.

Table III.
Illustration of the correlation between political organization
and frequency of marriage with relatives:

NAME OF VILLAGE:	own village:					foreign village:	total
	ancest	kinship	para	other relative	un- related		
NON-TRIBAL: Djehana	6	1	1	9	19	10	46
	village endogamy: 78 % family endogamy: 37 % cousin marriage: 17 %						
TRIBAL: Targah (Hamawad)	3	1	—	2	1	3	21
Koni Sard	4	—	2	1	1		
	village endogamy: 80 % family endogamy: 71 % cousin marriage: 37 %						
Koni Sard (non-tribal)	—	—	1	—	—	6	7

As a result of these contrasting frequencies of marriage types, the kinship composition of the two types of villages show important differences. The tribal village constitutes one close-knit kinship group, or is made up of distinct endogamous lineage segments of a larger lineage group. The non-tribal village, on the other hand, presents a less organized picture in terms of biological relationships; though predominantly endogamous, it is internally essentially unstructured above the household level. The non-tribal village might

thus be considered an example of Murdock's *deme* type of community, that is, an endogamous, but unstructured localized kin group (Murdock 1949, p. 63).

Some of the interrelations between marriage patterns, kinship composition of local groups, and type of political organization are fairly clear. In the tribal political system, patrilineal descent is of considerable importance. Membership in the political unit itself depends on patrilineal descent and one gains prestige from belonging to particular segments of the larger lineage. As compared to the non-tribal village, the whole status system is considerably more elaborated, as one would expect in a traditional system. Since marriage, both according to Islamic law and general Kurdish values should be between equals, and since each lineage segment wishes to preserve its own status position (and may in fact tend to over-rate it), neither sex is willing to marry *down* in the social scale, and near-kin marriage is the reasonable solution. Most clear is the status equivalence of children of brothers, and FaBrDa becomes the preferred spouse. [61]

This emphasis on equivalence is however only one factor inductive to a pattern of FaBrDa marriage. Perhaps more important is its political significance, briefly indicated previously.

A comparison of the tribal and non-tribal patterns may clarify this point. In the tribal system, power relations on the village level are more amenable to manipulation than in the non-tribal system, where most power is vested in the absentee landowner. At the same time, these power relations in the tribal village are defined in lineage and kinship terms. A man can only expect political support from his immediate agnatic relatives — those who by descent belong to his political sub-section — primarily brothers, sons, and brothers' sons, the relations to the latter being most critical. Political obligations can be reinforced in this group by giving them a daughter in marriage; conversely, the group would be alienated by being refused that daughter. The man who marries his daughter out of the lineage segment and takes a high bride-price for her thereby converts her into an economic asset, but also isolates himself from his agnatic relatives, his potential political supporters. He can then expect no support in a situation where actual power is important, such as in

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- [2] 581 factional disputes or feud, and his initial economic advantage gained from the daughter's marriage is thus abrogated. FaBrDa marriage thus reinforces the political implications of the lineage system. These relations might be summarized as follows:

TRIBAL:

power relations subject to manipulation + political units defined by agnatic kinship. = political emphasis to marriage — high freq. of FaBrDa marriage.

In the non-tribal village, on the other hand, the power relations are given to greater extent, in the sense that they are outside the control of most villagers. Furthermore, they are based on economic considerations more than on kinship. The political units are similarly not lineage segments, but defined purely in regional and residential terms. As a result, marriages are manipulated more for economic ends, wealth being the main criterion of village standing. In marrying off a daughter, a man therefore attempts either to take a high brideprice, or to create a link of kinship with an other family in the residential unit. Thus, in a circular way, FaBrDa marriage decreases and the importance of affinals in the endogamous community increases. This can be seen in the bilateral character of the kinship blocks that form the factions in a tenant village, as contrasted to the patrilineal lineage segments of the tribal village. For comparison with the tribal system, these relations might be summarized as follows:

NONTRIBAL:

power relations more given, + political units geographically defined = economic emphasis to marriage — lower freq. of FaBrDa marriage.

- 621 The unity of the local group in the tribal system springs from an unquestioned solidarity; the leader of such a group has few if any coercive means at his disposal. His powers are of the patriarchal, informal, kinship-modeled type, and generally derive from the fact of kinship. This in conjunction with the marriage pattern tends to produce a rather small local group in the settled tribal areas. Lineage

segments which have become widely separated in terms of descent 621 • will continue as separate, endogamous segments, and in such a situation it is difficult for one segment to accept the informally enforced authority of the leader of another segment. Especially where the two segments interpret their relative status positions differently, conflict will result, and the group will split in two. Such ruptures, though they may to a certain extent harm the group, function at the same time to keep it of such a size that the «unquestioned» leader with no coercive mechanisms can indeed lead it. Furthermore, the wider tribal organization coordinates the small local groups, and thus enables a larger number of them to act as a body when such concerted action is necessary, e. g. in defence or feud. As suggested in the discussion of Hamawand formal organization, this process of segmentation and splitting has been clearly recognized in the political organization.

In the non-tribal, tenant, village, on the other hand, solidarity springs from the common subjection to a landowner. The status differences within the group become less elaborate, since the landowner is in a position to make or break any person's career, and inherited status thus becomes less significant. Hostilities tend to be channelized towards *other* villages (see below, p. 129), and village endogamy becomes more important than lineage unity. Even so, FaBrDa and other close kin marriage continues in a moderately high frequency, maybe primarily due to the traditional privilege of reduced brideprice.

At the same time, the difference in the political powers of the leader in the tribal as compared to the non-tribal village can be related to this. In the latter, unstructured kin groups (with agnatic bias) of varying size and relationship exist side by side, and the landowner will tend to perpetuate this condition, at times as a conscious policy, by allotting land to any competent farmer who desires it, no matter what his village of origin might be. The «unquestioned» type of leader found in the tribal local group, whose judgement carries authority in itself, could not even attempt to control such a group. Coercive means — here the implied powers as the agent

- 62/ and advisor of the landowner, with the right to evict from land etc. — are necessary.

These interrelations might be represented diagrammatically as follows: (Diagram No. 7).

Diagram No. 7.

TRIBAL:

high frequency of FaBrDa marriage + leader has no coercive means → tight kinship group, remains small through fission.

small, tight kinship group ← leader needs no coercive means

leader has no coercive means + feud main expression of power → high frequency of FaBrDa marriage reinforces lineage solidarity

NON-TRIBAL:

lower frequency of FaBrDa marriage + intervillage hostility → larger endogamous group, includes whole village.

larger endogamous group + landlord wishes to settle new farmers on village land → leader needs coercive means

leader has coercive means + lineage organization lacking → feud of less importance → lower frequency of FaBrDa marriage.

THE BLOOD FEUD

In the tribal political system, the localized, territorial groups occupying the separate villages are thus in effect lineage segments. Their corporate unity is expressed in communal ownership of land, cooperation and coordination in herding and irrigation, and political unity for purposes of defence and raiding. The present section will attempt to explore the extent to which these lineage segments operate as corporate entities in the field relating to homicide and law: whether the principle of collective responsibility is applied and a pattern of blood feud results. A discussion of these problems should contribute further to our understanding of the nature of Kurdish lineage organization.

The association of a lineage organization, small endogamous communities, and a weak development of governmental institutions in

the Kurdish tribal system poses some unusual problems in this field. 621 •
 In the travel literature, Kurdish tribes have a deserved reputation as [181]
 warriors and bandits with little respect for human life, and without
 further analysis of the situation it has been assumed that much of
 their activities in this field is governed by a pattern of blood feuding.
 There is however good reason to analyse the situation more carefully,
 to discover just what patterns relating to homicide do in fact exist.

The material on which the following is based is, for obvious 628
 reasons, very incomplete. Today homicide is the matter with which
 the external administration is most concerned, and immediate inter-
 vention on its part tends to prevent other action from being taken,
 or fear of such intervention prevents actual case histories from
 being discussed. All the data that I do have, however, indicates the
 absence or very weak development of blood feuding patterns in
 Southern Kurdistan. This absence may seem surprising, and it is
 necessary to make clear just what is meant by the statement.

It seems useful in the analysis of this phenomenon to adhere to a
 fairly specific definition of what is meant by institutionalized blood
 feud. In its most characteristic form, it has been described in nume-
 rous African societies, e. g. the Nuba (Nadel 1947): «In Heiban
 [homicide] entails blood feud, which is carried on until exact revenge
 has been achieved; a man must be killed for a man, a woman for a
 woman; even in their age the two must be as closely matched as
 possible. The duty to avenge devolves, not on an individual, but on
 the whole clan Again, the revenge is not directed against an
 individual — the murderer himself — but against any member of
 the enemy clan who satisfies the conditions of this law of re-
 venge . . . », p. 151). The pattern is thus a special form of institution-
 alized revenge, whereby a whole group of persons is held collectively
 responsible for the behavior of one of its members, and where the
 wronged party is similarly not conceived as the individual or his
 close family, but as the whole larger group to which he belonged.
 The reaction is one of retaliation, governed by considerations of
 equality, and subsidiarily one of compensation by traditionally stipu-
 lated blood money (e. g. *ibid.* p. 251).

In this form, the blood feud is not found in Southern Kurdistan.

the tribal leader retains longest in the face of breakdown of tribal organization (cf. Memni, p. 126). The ability to avoid or resolve such conflicts between villages is a prerequisite for the maintenance of lineage unity, and it is therefore essential that the principle of collective responsibility is *not* applied to the co-residents of the village community.

Leach (op. cit., pp. 56-7) discusses a feud between two competing lineages in the Rowanduz area. Though in effect a struggle for political supremacy between rival lineages, it appears to be governed by ideas of retaliation and equality. Hay (op. cit.) further lists the traditionally stipulated blood money to be paid for various classes of people. The Rowanduz area, as contrasted to Southern Kurdistan, is one where a number of well-organized lineages are in close contact. This is due in part to a difference in local history. Suleimani is an old center, and the whole territory was long subject to the feudal Baban administration, based on non-lineage principles. The Rowanduz mountain areas, on the other hand, retained a presumably characteristic tribal organization, with numerous territorially separate, independent lineages till quite late, when it was united by conquest in a larger state system under the Mir og Rowanduz around 1830. It is interesting to speculate whether the fusion of numerous lineages into a larger state may not have changed some of the factors outlined above in such a way as to permit the institutionalized extension of the South Kurdish pattern of personal revenge to a pattern of blood feud.

In Southern Kurdistan, it is difficult to see what sanctions would be brought to bear against homicide within the maximal lineage, other than this pattern of personal revenge. Other mechanisms, once existing, may however have been disguised by now through the activities of the external administration.

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hierarchy of his village and society. The formal political organization, discussed so far, is thus only one factor in the hierarchy of supra- and sub-ordination in the village, and it must be related to the other formal organizations or hierarchies that exist.

However, this phrasing of the relationship makes use of distinctions foreign to Kurdish thinking. As stressed in the discussion of general features of formal political organizations, the concept of an *office* is undeveloped, and relations of super- and sub-ordination spring from differences in the *total* status of individuals. The Kurdish villager is not concerned with abstract features of village organization — he sees the organization of his own village, and other organizations affecting him, in terms of hierarchies of *individuals*, of named and familiar people, each with a familiar total status. But to analyse the relationships and clarify some of the principles operative in this type of organization, it is necessary to break down these total statuses into component elements. Previously, the formal political hierarchies have been discussed. In the present section, some other status positions and hierarchies will be divorced from their contexts in observed total statuses, and described. It is not implied that the total status of individuals is merely a sum-total of these part-statuses; the integration of such part-statuses into a total status will be discussed later, after the village scene, where such integration takes place, has been described. Our present concern is with the principles governing these various, analytically separable, hierarchies, and the part-statuses defined by these hierarchies.

There is a distinction to be made between these *hierarchies* of institutionalized positions of super- and sub-ordination in an organization — hierarchies of part-statuses — and a more general *scale* of prestige. A person's prestige depends on the degree to which he approaches certain ideals; and one may distinguish between various such scales, relating to degree of piety, age, wealth, etc. The prestige that accrues to the individual from high rating on such scales is convertible into influence and power; part-statuses in a hierarchy, on the other hand, give power directly. To complicate the situation further, high rating on a scale of power might also be said to contribute to a person's prestige. Several scales have been implied in the

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- 554 previous discussion, and are indeed implicit in the systems of status
 ● 621 hierarchies. An attempt will be made to relate the various status positions to ideals expressed on such scales, and in the final paragraphs of the section to outline the main scales on which individuals may be rated.

ECONOMIC CLASSES

- 565 The village hierarchy of class differences, based on division of
 621 labor and attendant differences in wealth, has been discussed above, pp. 20 ff. This hierarchy is, as we saw, produced primarily by the feudal principle of delegation of work on the land, and is conceptualized in terms of distinct social classes, each with traditionally defined rights and privileges in their relations to each other. Each class is thus a status category, and they are arranged in a hierarchy leading from *laborer* through *tenant farmer*, occasionally an *intermediary capitalist*, and culminating in the *landowner*. This is in itself a power hierarchy, since each superior status directly gives opportunity for control over persons of inferior status positions, within the traditional limits. The *freeholding farmer* class, on the other hand, occupies a status partly divorced from this immediate power hierarchy. Characteristically, where such freeholding farmers are found in a village partly controlled by a large landowner, every effort seems to be made on the part of the landowner to secure property rights also to the remaining fraction of land, and thus place all members of the community in the unambiguous hierarchy of control and power. Consequently freeholding farmers with property of any significance are generally found in tribally organized communities, and a dichotomy between only freeholding vs. only tenant communities generally holds true. *Freeholding farmers* as a class tend to be on a par with the *tenant farmer* class in the larger class system, and frequently control a small group of *laborers*, and in certain areas also the serf class, the *Meşkin*. The main features of the reciprocal relations between these classes have been sketched previously.

- 565 The special position of the *shepherd* remains to be discussed. He
 621 is essentially a laborer, working for a stipulated annual payment in
 243 kind (grain), but also receives a sheet of unleavened bread daily
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from each household he serves. The status of the shepherd is rather low, and he is frequently a foreigner in the village. In point of fact, many of the field laborers are also of foreign origin, but they become more or less assimilated in the community, whereas the solitary occupation of the shepherd prevents or delays his complete assimilation. — In general, the sheep and goats tend to be herded by the small boys of the village — sons of laborers — and the adult shepherd or herdsman is put in charge only of the large cattle.

The position as mullah (roughly equivalent to priest), regarded as an occupational category in the economic scale, is of minor importance in the small Kurdish villages, and is generally supplanted by farming. Other resident occupational statuses are rarely found.

The following is an example of the class composition of a small tenant village:

	households	persons
absentee landowner	—	—
tenant farmers (incl. one mullah)	25	123
laborers	5	22
shepherd	1	3
widows with no near kin	2	4
total	33	152

RELIGIOUS CATEGORIES

We have so far distinguished two main hierarchies, one governing the field of political organization, and related to a scale of administrative authority, the second governing the economic field, and related to a scale of wealth. A remaining group of named status positions, less clearly hierarchically organized, governs the religious field. These are the positions of Derwish, Shakh, Sayyid, Mullah, and Hadji.

Derwishes. The derwish religious fraternities illustrate, in their form and function, most clearly a general trend in the Kurdish villager's interpretation of Islam, and how the religious field may be brought into relation with the power hierarchy in the village community.

The Kurdish emphasis on power is in direct conflict with Moslem

712 can trace patrilineal descent from Ali unless the *whole tira* claims
613 such descent. None of the South Kurdish *tiras* attempt this, however. *Sbaikhs* are consequently characteristic of the non-tribal areas, where they occupy the whole gamut of social positions from landless laborer to feudal lord.

In characteristic Kurdish fashion, *Sbaikh* families tend to split up into small endogamous lineage segments, and, though the census materials gathered from a few villages is not statistically reliable in the matter, there is strong suggestion that FaBrDa or other close kin marriage reaches considerably higher frequency than usual in tenant villages, and approaches that found in the politically organized lineages, the *tiras*. However, any embrave organization uniting the whole *Sbaikh* descent group, or major segments of it, such as would in fact convert it into a type of widely dispersed *tira*, is lacking. It would on the other hand be equally misleading to think of the *Sbaikh* group as an endogamous cast, since extra-group marriages do in fact take place, and the emphasis is not on *Sbaikh* endogamy but, in usual Kurdish fashion, on *local lineage* endogamy. It is convenient to think more in terms of these local endogamous *Sbaikh* lineages, where they are found in the village community, and relate their comparatively higher endogamy to an effort to retain a special status in the local community by not dispersing kinship obligations too widely in that community. Where *Sbaikh* families occupy higher social positions, this stress on lineage endogamy tends to disappear, or seems to reflect efforts to prevent the dispersal of family property through the multiple Koranic inheritance rights.

792 An example of a *Sbaikh* lineage group of tenant farmers, residing
581 in a small village community, might be given. Of 33 households in
621 the village, 7 are of the *Sbaikh* lineage, the remaining 26 belonging
613 to various larger and smaller kin groups. Of the heads of these 7
554 *Sbaikh* households, 4 have married a FaBrDa, 2 another close relative, and only 1 a non-relative from outside the community (the sister of a neighboring headman). At least in this generation, there is thus no intermarriage with other families in the local community.

The head of the *Sbaikh* lineage is regarded as the most important man in the village, but he is not elected *kibbe* (village headman).

The present *kikba*, whose father and grandfather held the post before him, belongs to another, slightly larger kin block, counting at least 9 households. Furthermore, the frequency of family endogamy in this family of which the *kikba* is the head is less than 50 %, which may account for his «wider appeal» in the community. Thus the emphasis on the special status of the *Shaikh* lineage also tends to isolate this lineage, in part to their disadvantage.

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The majority of the *Shaikhs* in the village are tenant farmers, and tend to be among the better situated. One occupies the position as mullah, to which his son will clearly succeed him. However, one of the *Shaikh* household heads is a landless laborer, giving a class distribution in the *Shaikh* lineage of 5 farmers / 1 laborer, as compared to 18 farmers / 4 laborers in the remainder of the community. The class position of the *Shaikh* lineage as a whole is thus not significantly high.

The status of this small *Shaikh* lineage might be contrasted to that of the above mentioned Leaders of Derwish, or to that of *Shaikh Mahmud*, both of whom have achieved their high position in part by virtue of their descent from the Prophet. The most reasonable generalization seems to be that membership in the *Shaikh* descent group defines a type of position in the religious field which contributes to the general esteem in which a person is held, and which may, in certain situations, contribute to justify a high position of actual power, but which in no way automatically ascribes such power to the individual.

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A category of travelling holy men, similarly claiming descent from *Mohammed*, are given the Arabic name *Seyyid* by Kurdish villagers. Whereas the Kurdish *Shaikhs* claim descent specifically from *Hussein*, one of *Mohammed's* two grandsons, through a medieval Persian theologian, the claims of the wandering *Seyyids* are more variable. On the other hand, this reference to religious sanctity forms the basis of their livelihood. The appellation *Shaikh* need only imply high rating on a purely religious scale of sanctity — *Seyyids* convert this into a definite status position, fundamental to their occupation. Preferably conspicuously clothed, and wearing green head-dress as a symbol of their status, they ride from village to village carrying old

responsibility for religious education taken over by the leader of the local *Shaiikh* family. On the other hand, an intelligent mullah, though often formalistic and introvert in his orientation, may play a considerable part in improving the intellectual and sanitary standard of the village (the subject of clean and unclean having importance in a religious context), but does not seem to attempt to extend his influence any wider. His high intellectual standard and foreign values tend to alienate him from the «petty squabbles» of the village; and an ambitious attitude has no real place in the piously fatalistic Islamic world view. To the extent he does not convert his status and prestige into a de-facto power position, the mullah might be said not to be fully integrated into the social structure of the village. He is similarly in no sense an indispensable resident in the village community — very frequently, he is called in only for funerals, naming ceremonies etc., or these functions may even be performed by a local derwish or *Shaiikh*. The pattern of training blind boys, necessarily marginal to village society, as mullahs, may in part be related to an appreciation of this marginal position which the mullah occupies.

Hadji. The *Hadji*, on the other hand, is an ordinary member of the village community. His position is related to the scale of piety, and derives simply from having completed a pilgrimage to Mecca. The title, however, is one of considerable respect — in part because it also implicitly indicates high rating on the scale of wealth.

The whole institution of the pilgrimage is the result of the command by the Prophet Mohammed, that any man who has the necessary means to make the pilgrimage *and* support his family at home, or whose family is able to support itself without him, should once in his lifetime journey to the holy city of Mecca. Thus the title of *Hadji* indicates (a) a pious eagerness to follow the command of Mohammed, and (b) moderately prosperous circumstances. One rarely finds more than 3—4 *Hadjis* in any one village; these will tend to be at least among the leading members of their community.

Formerly, the initiative was individual and the journey hazardous, often achieved by relatively greater physical exertion and less expense, and the title of *Hadji* was thus less of a symbol of wealth than at present.

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55† important Kurdish values relating to individual prestige. On the other hand, they are not pure constructs of the investigator, since they do represent verbalized ideals which the Kurdish villager is swart of as alternative modes of behavior in situations. The following are some important scales on which the prestige of a Kurdish villager may be measured:

Family: (a) prestige derived from descent from a person or persons with high prestige, or (b) membership in a large effective kinship unit.

Age: prestige derived from experience and maturity, increasing up to the onset of senility.

Sex: dichotomy favoring the male and relations in the male line.

Wealth: prestige from capital, real or movable property, and occupations tending to produce such.

Sacred powers: the extent of 'unseen powers from Good Forces' delegated to the person.

Sanctity: the actual embodiment of sacred powers, or sacred position achieved by personal suffering and renunciation of the world.

Learning and piety: prestige from knowledge of, and conformity to, Moslem religious and moral ideals.

Honor and Beauty: the degree of approach to the Kurdish 'shero' — physical prowess, valor, a certain recklessness, respect for women, kindness to the poor, unending hospitality, etc.

THE VILLAGE HIERARCHY

- 62/ The formal political structures, and certain subsidiary hierarchies have been outlined, and it was pointed out how the actual power connected with positions in these hierarchies is dependent upon the prestige of the persons occupying them. The organization of the village thus becomes one of super- and sub-ordination of individuals, and universal relevance of status differences in the relations of these individuals.

However, because of the presence of several separable hierarchies of organization, the village relations of super- and sub-ordination do

not have an opportunity to freeze and become converted into a formal structure (cf. the relations between Hamawand and Mankjin, and the latter's use of the derwish brotherhoods). Individuals are constantly aligning into factions, manipulating these hierarchies, and the superordination of any particular formal status position will constantly be questioned, and must therefore be supported by the necessary superordination in terms of actual prestige. Thus, if the village were left to itself, the formal village organization of super- and sub-ordination would at any time relate to the differences in total prestige between the individuals holding these formal positions.

An external factor does however enter in the autonomous Kurdish system, which tends to produce a de-facto power hierarchy more or less different from this *ideals* hierarchy. With the backing of an outside force, individuals may have powers vested in them out of proportion to their actual prestige in the local community. This type of outside force will usually be related to wealth — in effect, before the country was subjected to external administration, the economic ability to buy riflemen and thus tyrannize a village or section, as in the case of many feudal lords, or on the other hand the ability of one tribe or group, from superior numbers or organization, to suppress other tribes or groups.

The de-facto power hierarchy will then be determined by the balance between the one faction's ability to buy or otherwise introduce power into the system, as compared to the other faction's ability to rally supporters, referring to the *ideals* hierarchy based on prestige. An important feature of this balance is the fact that the further the de-facto hierarchy differs from the *ideals* hierarchy, the relatively more external power is needed to maintain the position, since the opposing faction's ability to rally supporters increases rapidly with the extent of the abuse. — Obviously, the actual balance varies over the area and through time, and a diversity of types of village organization results.

We have thus arrived at some appreciation of the structural reasons for the confusing variety of types of formal organization in the South Kurdish area. At the moment, however, we are not concerned with the specific historic events in these fictional con-

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- 62) flicts, producing the present distribution of types, since these depend to considerable extent on variables outside the village system. More important in this connection is the structure of the «ideal» hierarchy, primarily how it develops and asserts itself in the village. For this purpose, the constitution of the village community and village life should be investigated further.

92 partial protection from the icy gales that sweep down from the Zagros mountains. In the warm weather, the family moves out on the flat rooftop after sundown, primarily to benefit from the cool breeze off the mountains.

X1 Wherever a hill is available — which means nearly everywhere in Kurdish territory — the village is placed on a steep slope. That way, the flat rooftop of one house forms a kind of front terrace for the house above it in the hill, and the families tend to use the roof of the house below them for their own purposes, and so on down the line. As indicated by this, the village forms a very compact unit — maybe originally for defense purposes; certainly in part to save trouble by making double use of all walls and partitions in house construction. Frequently, the village is placed in the slope below a cool spring; only in the low country does it depend on wells for water. A common feature is a small pool, fed directly from the spring and protected from pollution by a low stone wall. Around the pool stand tall, shady trees, from which no branch must be broken, and in it one frequently finds large fish, fed by the villagers, ~~which are usually given to the women of the village and are a source for~~ ritual washing and a favorite place of prayer.

- C21 Although considerable respect is shown for the sanctity of the home, many household activities must necessarily become public, especially in the half-year when they center around the rooftops. A certain everyday pattern of community life thus emerges in the cool of the evening. It requires much cooperation and haste to direct the returning animals to their respective homes in the evening, with shouting and chasing of stray goats over rooftops and along partitions, away from the grainbins and waterkins and infants. Later, each family gathers around the evening meal, and then there is visiting back and forth, news being swapped, a glow in the dark from the fires where the tea is brewing, and a steady murmur of conversation. All through the night, the clamor and activity continues, with braying donkeys, crying babies, dogs chasing cats, cows shifting and groaning.

Though the patterns of each village differ, and any one of them may appear to be only utter confusion, there are, of course, regulari-

tion that may be discerned. The village, in all its confusion, was the scene on which the competing factions set out their parts; ever faintly glowing firm of crowding individuals are discerned and appraised in terms of the ideals expressed in the above outlined rules; control is attempted and leadership emerges. All these activities take place at more or less standardized occasions — and it is these occasions that will be described in the present chapter. In effect, any type of community or group activity gives an opportunity for status and competition to express itself, and a description of these occasions thus becomes virtually a description of community life.

INFORMAL GROUP FORMATION

Charles James Rich, visiting Salimani in the 1820's, was surprised at the regularity of the patterns of visiting, at the large groups that would congregate in the house of some establishment or in the open, and spend their time smoking and drinking tea, while talking away into the small hours. *Rich, 1820's, Salimani, p. 100* — also found strongly developed in Salimani today.

In the village, the farmer must of course keep rather different hours, and he inevitably rises with the sun; but the same pattern is discernable. In the summer nights, visitors may be received on the rooftops; in the daytime, or when the weather is colder, any important visitor is showed to a special room, and a more or less standard group will quickly congregate. In the hot weather, other kinds of groups will congregate during the day in any bit of shade — under the trees by the pool, or on the roof-tops that are shaded by eaves. These informal groups seem essentially of two types, one the group of village leaders in the smoke-filled rooms to borrow an idiom from American politics, the other a less closely defined crowding society of persons of lower status.

The smoke-filled rooms. In the traditional tribal system, the Agbe of the village should keep a parlorhouse, in which the head of families, all kinsmen of the Agbe, and any visitor have a right to sit. In the area around Rowanfat, this seems to be an institution of

514 considerable economic importance, and a source of much prestige for
519 the hospitable Aghe (Leach op. cit., pp. 28-31).

The practice in South Karlish area differs somewhat from this ideal — it would be a very important man who went to the expense of keeping an open house in a special room; men of such importance and means are no longer found as residents in the villages. The typical Aghe among the Mamuwandi will receive visitors in a small room, kept clean and constantly empty for the purpose; the hospitality extended to the visitor is out of all proportion to the means of the host, but is not normally extended to all persons who would have a right to sit in the guesthouse. Similarly, from being the common center of the village, to which all the important men repair, it has become in fact the center of only a faction in the village, though admittedly the most important one. This development is of course carried further in the non-tribal villages, where every man of any importance attempts to utilize a certain room as guest-house, playing the role of host and senior member among the individuals who normally congregate there.

520 The manner when one of these visitors arrives, he should at least
521 be served tea. There is a formal pattern of etiquette attached to this, which unfortunately for the visitor who tries to be polite varies
522 between different areas — some places, one is expected to leave after the third glass, other places they insist that the only polite thing is to drink seven or even eleven glasses in a sitting. The act of distributing of the tea gives an opportunity to express the prestige scale by the sequence in which people are served; also, in the presence of a visitor, everyone is careful to use the proper honorific titles to one another. All the time, cigarettes of dry Karlish tobacco are smoked, the men crowd together in the half darkness and argue vigorously, the fire smolders and smokes, and the atmosphere quickly becomes extremely heavy.

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- 621 The persons assembling normally in the smoke-filled room are
524 the policy makers of the village or a main faction of it. In this
forum, all matters of common interest are discussed, the actions of
the various members of the group coordinated; and opinions and
plans crystallized. Within the group, of course, relative prestige is

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constantly measured, and rivalry between members is directed towards out-doing each other in the eyes of the group as a whole.

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Roof-top society. An other immediately apparent type of informal group which is constantly formed is that of roof-top society. The smoke-filled room houses a more polite and essentially closed society; roof-top society includes more diverse persons, and emerges from practically any aggregation of individuals who are not engaged in productive pursuits. There is a tendency for the individuals of the highest prestige to stay away from such groups, since the joking and horse-guying may be rather personal and quite free, and the rules of propriety behavior easily forgotten. Thus, though formed from an open aggregation of individuals, which any male transient as well as villagers may join, it develops in practice into a gang of village youths and men, primarily the younger and more irresponsible, and the men of lower class status.

The same problems that are debated in the smoke-filled rooms may also be discussed here, but with less stress on policy forming and more stress on the anecdotal. Prestige differences in the group ~~image may directly determine who is made fun of and who feels in a~~ position to mediate. At the same time, the group serves as a forum for complaints against abuses. Here the attitudes of the less privileged sections of the village to specific issues become coordinated; pressures are applied and excitement created that may lead to concerted action where persons feel they have been badly wronged.

Women's groups. Women are excluded from both these types of groups, as well as from «political» activities in general. Though they prepare the food that may be consumed in the smoke-filled rooms, they should not show themselves there, and, for example, tea-brewing, which should be done on the spot, is in the hands of a younger male kinsman of the host. In fact, when a visitor arrives in whom they take an interest, they may find domestic work to do within earshot though out of sight, or a small son of the house is slipped in as informant. The actual extent to which women contribute in shaping the opinions of their men is difficult to evaluate, and surely varies tremendously, but is usually probably slight. On the other hand, they have access to information, especially gossip.

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921 which the head of the family has not, and may thus be of some
 915 importance. The main aggregations of women where such gossip is
 exchanged are found around the water-hole, where water for the
 house is fetched, and clothes washed and beaten. The actual visiting
 between women seems predominantly to be limited by kinship, most
 frequent are the daughter's visits to her mother. Such visiting is
 concentrated in the hours just before noon, when the men are occu-
 pied and there are no pressing household duties.

641 In everyday life, there are thus three types of larger groupings
 615 that provide a forum for factionalism and leadership: (a) the men
 of high prestige congregates in «the smokefilled rooms», (b) the men
 of less prestige get together in an informal «roofing society», and
 (c) the women of the community meet and gossip by the village
 water-hole. None of these groupings, however, pretend to be repre-
 sentative of the community as a whole, and none of them are
 primarily integrative in their function.

RITUAL UNITY OF THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

[12] Mosque. The complete status hierarchy of individuals in the
 711 village only emerges clearly, and the effective integration of the
 community is only achieved, through the truly communal village
 activities. These will tend to be of a more formal and ritual type,
 and are more or less closely related to religion. In the villages in
 which a mosque is found, the most obvious occasion is the Friday
 sermon. However, the position of the mullah varies considerably, as
 indicated above; and many village mullahs find it difficult to make
 the occasion truly communal, to induce their villagers to attend
 sermons at the mosque — «they come home from the fields very
 tired, and would rather sit at home». Where a mullah of high
 799 prestige is found, he will manage to collect a considerable fraction
 719 of the village around him on such occasions, and by religious teaching
 raise the standard of the population, as measured on the scale of
 learning and piety. This in turn reflects on the village as a whole,
 the pressure to attend Friday sermons increases, and a unity and

intensity of village loyalty is produced that is rarely found in other tenant villages.

Ritual homage. Whereas many villages lack the central focus of a mosque, religious activities still have considerable integrative functions, especially the standardized prayers, or, more properly, the ritual homage paid to Allah five times daily, facing Mecca, as the Prophet Muhammad commanded. This homage being of a standardized type and involving a stereotyped series of postures, supposedly performed simultaneously by all the villagers, it symbolizes a solidarity and *gemeinschaft* that must be re-inferred, shall the community perish. The personal prayer occasionally appended is unimportant; the emphasis is on the common ritual.

The time for prayer is specified in relation to sunrise and sundown, e. g. one two hours preceding, another one and a half hours after sundown. Since no clocks or watches are commonly available in the village, calling to prayer gives opportunity for controlling behavior in the religious field, and thus for the emergence of a type of leadership. Where a mullah is present, he naturally performs the function; where there is no mullah, the local dervish or head of the local dervishes tries to assume this responsibility. His melodious chant certainly shreds a Western ear in the quiet evening; but the call is not necessarily responded to very quickly; furthermore, *Hadji* and other important persons will tend to take an autonomous view of the proper time for prayer. Thus, unless a mullah of some importance is present, the degree of leadership implied in calling to prayer is rather slight. However, this fact would not seem to detract significantly from the integrative symbolism of the simultaneous ritual homage to God.

Communal magic. The only cases of communal magic which I became aware of are concerned with the most critical and unpredictable question in Kurdish subsistence: rain. The other examples of magic are of different types: The ordinary dervish antics, performed in public, are not instrumental in the sense that they are directed towards achieving some practical and generally coveted end; the magic connected with amulets for protection etc. are of a personal and private kind. The art of rainmaking, on the other hand, is still

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719 practiced as a communal rite in cases of need, and gives the compe-
731 tent derwish an opportunity to reinforce his special position and demonstrate his control of power.

The actual rite is in rough outline quite simple. After an all-night session of prayer and purification on the part of the derwish, he is taken to a pool in the near-by, dwindling stream, and submerged in the water.

It is difficult to say just what degree of emotional intensity is involved in the rite as far as a majority of the participants is concerned. In the special case in question, they did not seem particularly impressed — the derwish involved was one who was frequently the object of mild horseplay, and the actual act of ducking him might have some appeal to the less serious minded. However this may be, the gravity of drought should not be underestimated, and would hardly be conducive to horseplay. The winter rains seemed to have stopped much too early, and the rite was a response to this serious situation. Considering this, the performance was probably more emotionally charged than some of the superficial comments might suggest, and certainly served to emphasize the unity and solidarity of the group. — It might incidentally be noted that this specific rite also was successful, in that fairly heavy rains followed shortly.

719 Thus, this ritual of rainmaking is concerned with a very critical
621 communal problem, and enables the derwish to assume a momentary
731 position of dominant importance in his community. An interesting deviation from the stated norm was also observed in this case: the young son of the village Agbe was submerged alongside with the derwish¹). This equivalence may be significant in several respects. From the point of view of the derwish, it indicates the considerable extent of his momentary prestige — from a normal status of laborer he is elevated to temporary equivalence with the heir apparent of the village Agbe. It may also illustrate something in the Kurdish conception of power: there is no really clear distinction made between the

¹) The fact that the son rather than the Agbe himself was chosen is best understood in terms of the slightly ambivalent situation, and the rather undignified appearance of the actor following immersion.

sacred powers of the derwish and the practical powers of the political leader; both are equally potent in the ritual situation, and their character may be covered best by the concept of personal charisma.

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THE FEAST

The feast occupies a very prominent place in the communal life of the village, and is regarded as an active agent in producing solidarity and unity, as well as being a symbol of such unity. The fact of eating together in itself produces certain mutual obligations and solemnizes feelings of sympathy. The Bedouin ideal, that any person with whom you have eaten is inviolable for a minimum period of time, is not actually applied in Kurdish territory, but is well known and approved of as being highly ethical. Essentially similar, though less formal, obligations are implied in the Kurdish concept of sharing the bread.

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Furthermore, the feast is a forum for conspicuous consumption, and thus gives the host an opportunity to display his wealth, and to create and re-affirm ties of friendship by generosity. Thus the person who gives the feast can enhance his prestige in the village considerably; hospitality is an integral aspect of the Kurdish ideal of a man, conversely, a person with a reputation for miserliness suffers corresponding loss of prestige.

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A feast in one form or another is thus a fairly frequent occurrence in the village. Since it will involve at least a major part and usually the whole of the village, it provides one of the major occasions in which leadership and moderate rivalry is expressed, and in which the relative prestige and resultant social status positions become systematized. Essentially, these feasts are of two major types, (1) connected with religious festivals, or (2) marking transitions of status in the life cycle of members of the society.

Religious festivals. In some villages, the whole of the holy month of Ramadan is celebrated by regular communal evening meals at the mosque or in the village square. In this arrangement, either each household may in turn serve as hosts for the whole village, or each family brings its own food. Only the men partake in the meal; for them, it becomes a social occasion of major importance. The feast

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621 takes place after sundown, since there should be a fast observed
574 during the day in Ramadan month — as a matter of fact, this fast
527 is observed by very few. However, this degree of Ramadan celebration is not usual. The last three days of that month, on the other hand, are universally regarded as holidays, and serve as formal occasion for forgiving enemies, affirming village loyalties, and reinforcing ties of friendship.

Ramadan is defined in terms of a year of lunar months, and thus falls some days earlier in relation to the seasons for every year. At the time of the present fieldwork, the end of Ramadan coincided roughly with the completion of the harvest; it is difficult to say which aspects of the proceedings were connected with the one, as distinct from the other event. The celebration on the main, first day consisted of four major phases: (1) religious service (2) formal communal meal (3) payment of tax to the mosque (4) informal social celebrations.

796 The religious service was led by the son of the mullah of the
527 neighboring village, since the village in which I was staying at the
621 time had no mullah of its own. It was held in the house of the *Hadji*, the actual leader and *kibla* of the village. The local derwish, reacting to the presence of only an un-ordained officiant, tried to assert himself by interjecting loud and pious exclamations, but was soon quieted down as the mullah's son speeded on through the text.

After the ritual followed the communal meal, supplied by the *Hadji*, and his prestige profited by a subtle balance between the conspicuous exhibition of plenty tempered with a pious avoidance of over-indulgence. Two of the lower-class laborers, who had been figuring and feeling out of place, took the opportunity to bury themselves by serving the tea; but the *Hadji* insisted upon their status as guests, and they were quickly relieved by a young son, whom he called in for the purpose. Before the meal, hands were kissed (with a tendency towards reciprocity only between social equals or very close kin), misunderstandings forgotten and grudges forgiven. After the meal, some small boys appeared and kissed the hands of all the men present.

This being completed, the heads of village households each pledged

a tax of three kg. of grain to the mosque for each household member. This is done by each of the men in turn seating himself before the mullah, with a symbolic tray of grain between them. The men follow one another in a descending order of prestige, involving public acceptance and confirmation of the actual hierarchy of individuals in the village. At one or two points there was some hesitation, and very elusive momentary pressures were brought to bear by the group on the actors to assure the «right» sequence. This occasion also gave the *Hadji* an opportunity to affirm his leading position in the village by pledging 3.5 kg. pr. person to the mosque, and with a grand gesture paying for a poor widow in the village, not represented by any male, as well as for my interpreter, who, not being of the village, did not dispose of any grain.

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At the completion of this, the group dispersed. Later in the day, the landowner appeared, and people also from the neighboring villages drifted in in informal groups and congregated in a large circle in the courtyard of the house in which he was staying. For the remaining period, celebrations involved only smaller, informal groups and individual visiting.

— I have chosen to describe this occasion in some detail, since it was observed under favorable conditions and illustrates the situation in which the hierarchy of individuals in the village is expressed, and how the individual's rating of himself is confirmed or contradicted by the group. Other religious festivals serve an essentially similar function, though they may in part be more amenable to manipulation and «social climbing». For example, two months ten days after Ramadan follows *Qorbani*, the feast of sacrifice, lasting four days, and centering around the killing of a large animal — sheep or preferably cow. Any person may volunteer to do *Qorbani*, and offer his cow up — though there are probably informal controls on who may in fact presume to that extent. *Ma'ulad*, Mohammed's birthday, is similarly celebrated by a semi-communal feast and conspicuous consumption; the various other holidays are of a more private kind.

Rites de passage. The various rites marking transitions in the status position of individuals through their life cycle are less formally controlled. They are communal in a different sense from the ritual-

765 in the village as a whole¹⁾. Any conspicuous excesses in celebration
are however tempered by pious ideals of moderation.

574 To summarize: the *fest*, in its various religious and personal appli-
554 cations, offers a forum for competition and rivalry between persons,
• 621 especially in the field of wealth, but this aspect is somewhat tempered
576 by ideals of moderation and control inherent in the other scales by
which individuals are evaluated. Furthermore, these communal or
semi-communal occasions formalize the relative prestige positions of
individuals, as seen by other individuals, and by the group as a whole.
These prestige hierarchies find expression especially in situations
where a regular order of serving or acting is observed. When all the
tea comes out of the host's one samovar, individuals must necessarily
be served in a sequence. In Kurdish culture, as in most other cultures,
the *first* position in a sequence, and in fact precedence in general, is
regarded as symbolic of status. These occasions thus necessarily come
to expose a status hierarchy, and that in a familiar context where
the symbolism is clear and rivalry for relative places conscious. In
sitting in serving, and in any sequence of appearance, this rule is
followed. In the fluid type of hierarchy found in the Kurdish
villages where status positions are not crystallized in a formal struc-
ture, but are constantly being re-evaluated in terms, in the final
instance, of the common denominator of power, it is essential that
some mechanism is found whereby relative status and power can be
compared and made public by non-violent means. Characteristically,
practically all the major communal occasions in the villages of
Southern Kurdistan involve several instances where this hierarchy
can be expressed.

RAIDING AND WARFARE

724 The final and most spectacular occasion for the emergence of
704 leadership and the expression of a status hierarchy is offered by the

¹⁾ This ritual slaughter of animals has a general significance as a sign of respect — when an important visitor arrives, the throat of a sheep is cut just before the visitor approaches, so that the blood may flow across the road just as he passes over.

Chapter VI

Integration of part-statuses

- (21) Such then is the «scene» on which most social activities take place, and where control and organization emerges. This organization however, as has repeatedly been pointed out, is one of supra- and subordination of individuals, and not a formal hierarchy of offices, divorced from the persons filling them. The actual position of the individual thus derives from all of his part-statuses, from his prestige, as derived from his rating on the suggested scales, and from his ability to exploit the possibilities offered by these factors and by chance occasions.

The integration of all these analytically separable factors into a final position in the local group hierarchy poses a problem, and in this problem the familiar anthropological techniques and concepts can offer little help. In a traditional system, where individuals are permitted to make political demands on their followers, not by virtue of being vested with an abstract office, but as individuals by virtue of their higher status, there must be a single, unitary hierarchy of individuals. In Kurdish society, status is derived from a number of separate and in part mutually exclusive hierarchies and contexts; these elements of status, or part-statuses, must needs be added up somehow — some common denominator must exist by which the elements are given relative values. This common denominator is locally spoken of, and it has seemed analytically convenient to regard it as, a wide concept of power. But it is fruitless to attempt to con-

struct a formula for the addition of these part-statuses. Their relative weights are revealed only in very few contexts of real life, since such a tremendous number of variables combine in the relations between any two individuals.

At least in certain situations, some qualifications to leadership take precedence over others, and impediments in one field can be overcome or outweighed by advantages in other fields. With respect to the part-status positions, some of these seem to be mutually incompatible, in that they can not easily be occupied by the same individual; others are mutually exclusive to the extent of not co-existing in the same local community. Finally, there are conflicts of loyalties: which units of reference take precedence over others in a situation of choice.

The culture of the Kurdish villager is not an integrated culture, in the sense that there are no discrepancies and conflicts between norms. Various rules and values may in certain situations come into clear opposition. Though for some such conflicts, standardized solutions or circumlocutions have been developed, this is most clearly not true of all. Such unresolved problems are the fields where change and adaptation take place. But by virtue of the lack of consistent logic and a minimum of agreement, these are fields that can not readily be described, much less analyzed, by the anthropologist. The following section contains a discussion, based on my own and some secondary material, of some of the more crude and obvious aspects of this situation. All I can attempt to do is demonstrate a few clearer cases of precedence and incompatibility, and suggest certain systematic distinctions between questions of (a) impediments to leadership, (b) general incompatibility of part-statuses, and (c) precedence of loyalties to alternative groups and identifications.

IMPEDIMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS TO LEADERSHIP

The order of importance of the various qualifications to high positions are most clearly revealed in the emergence of formally recognized leadership. In certain situations, impediments to leadership may be overcome by the possession of other qualifications that take precedence. Since autonomous Kurdish institutions are only partially

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- 563 In summary, the following diagram (No. 9) suggests the relative
 62/ positions of various social categories in the village hierarchy, and
 554 their approximate spread on an ordinate of low-high — obviously
 a very impressionistic diagram, for illustrative purposes only. Different
 part-statutes that do not overlap in their spread on the low-high




Figure No. 8. Relative rates of some acid anhydrides.

sis are incompatible; furthermore, the mullah often not being fully integrated in the community, there will be a lower frequency of combination of the status of mullah with the other, theoretically, combinations of the status of mullah with the other, theoretically, compatible, part-statuses.

PRECEDENCE IN LOYALTIES

- 57/ In some conflict situations, any specific individual may be faced with a choice as to which group or person he should support — primarily the alternatives of lineage group vs. kin, lineage group

67 him by overstepping his «reasonable» area of free grace in his relation to them.

In thinking about social relations, this essentially involves substituting the word «reasonable» for «rights» — the latter being rigid and absolute, the former being defined in terms of numerous considerations of the specific situation. Obviously, different individuals with different temperament, experience, and values will have various ideas of what is «reasonable» — consequently, any type of superordination that does not involve constant face-to-face relations with the subordinates must be an uneasy one — hence the importance of the bodyguard, even for the more minor Kurdish leaders.

In the case of conflicting loyalties, the specific situation in the village and area concerned decides which group identification takes precedence. This is clearly illustrated in choices between identification with, or loyalties to, the landlord, the lineage or kin group, and the village community. How completely considerations of power override general rules of loyalty is finally illustrated by conflicts within the family of the old Baban Pasha.

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• 621
64 Lineage group vs. lord. In the Kurdish tribal system, genealogical and local groups coincide, and these groups are also the organizational units in a formal political sense. A somewhat similar correspondence is characteristic of the non-tribal tenant villages. Thus, since they coincide, the relative importance of the identification with the kin group and with the political unit, as personified by the political officeholder or lord, can not easily be determined. Only in the rather unusual cases where the two are different, do problems of identification and precedence arise.

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622 An example of the relative powers of the landowner vs. the lineage leader is offered by the Barzi Gewra group, settled on the land of Shaikh Mahmud as tenant farmers. The Barzi Gewra are one of ten branches of the Mewsi tria, the Rait of which is Said Ali Khebat of Sahimani.

Formally, the position of the Rait is quite similar to that in other tria, though more directly dependent on «democratic» approval. Succession is decided by a council of the important men of the ten villages. This council is limited by informal controls, being open to

64 FalkeDa marriage pattern, the characteristics become meaningful, and the different function of kinship terminology in the Kurdish type of lineage organization and other types of lineages emerges:

- 64 62] Where a moderately consistent pattern of FalkeDa marriage and other close family endogamy is followed, the local, endogamous community becomes in fact the descent group. In the Kurdish system, these local descent groups are given names — in effect village names, which thus indicate both residence and descent, and thereby political affiliation. The corporate framework of the lineage is thus given directly in the named residence units, and kinship terms are unnecessary to further emphasize this corporate character. On the contrary, the terminology measures collateral distance, of considerable importance where relatives beyond a certain degree tend to form separate, endogamous sub-sections, disruptive to village unity and ultimately conducive to feuds. Essentially, however, the kinship terminology is liberated from its functions in defining political units in the lineage system, and is utilized simply to describe relationship, possibly with a primary interest in inheritance. Here the effect of the complex Islamic law of inheritance may have been considerable — it has in fact been applied to sufficient extent in its more subtle ramifications.

64 62] A second modification of the usual pattern, concerned with law and the blood feud, would seem to follow from the combination of a lineage organization and preferential FalkeDa marriage. Fortes (1913) summarizes: "when the lineage is found as a corporate group, all the members of the lineage are to consider legally equal and represent the lineage when they exercise legal and political rights and duties in relation to society at large. This is what underlies so-called collective responsibility in blood vengeance and self-help as among the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940) and the Bedouin (Fortes 1913)." On the background of this, the probable absence of weak development of collective responsibility and blood feud in Kurdish society might seem puzzling.

Where the lineage system is associated with a pattern of village endogamy, however, as in the Kurdish system, the maximal lineage becomes in effect the society, not merely one organized group

within it. Thus the whole situation in which jural concepts are to be applied changes radically. No supra-lineage political authority is developed, and no interaction between a lineage and other groups is necessary, except for a certain minimum of trade. At the time of the present fieldwork, of course, and probably for most tribes in the area at most times in the last 300 years, the maximal lineages were in fact not totally independent. They were, however, subject to external administration, and that not consistently; and the indigenous social organization does not call for or lead to any supra-lineage integration. The concept of jural equivalence is thus meaningless as applied to a Kurdish maximal lineage; such a concept could only be relevant as applied within the lineage, between groups of recognized blood relatives within the political unit. In this case, the disruptive effects of conflicts between what are in fact territorial groups within the unit prevent the extension of patterns of revenge to include larger collectivities than the immediate family, or a group of associations.

However, the lineage organization is only one type of social organization prevalent in the Kurdish area. With the breakdown of this regional organization based on politically autonomous, endogenous descent groups, the integration of the separate, endogenous villages into larger political units poses a new problem. Non-tribal Kurdish social organization might be summarized as a system of hierarchical statuses, identified with particular individuals, and sanctioned by force more than anything else. This organization is then expanded into a larger, regional, semi-feudal system. This was at best a very labile structure, until frozen by the intervention of effective external administration which favored *status quo*. In the place of the regional displacement of lineage groups in large tribal districts, one finds an open web of relations between separate, endogenous, socially quite autonomous small villages. There form no natural larger units, except in purely physiographic or dialect terms. In this open web, feudal hierarchies might establish areas of influence, but until external administration imposed an arbitrary regional classification in terms of counties and districts, any social units tended to be extremely fluid.

- (11) Parsons (1952) states the problem in general terms: «There seem to be certain elements of inherent instability in societies where the overwhelming bulk of the population is organized on the basis of peasant village communities. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the village community as a primary focus of solidarity can only within very narrow limits be an effective unit for the organization of the use of force. It is, in the face of any more extensive organization, not a defensible unit. Hence there must always be a 'super-structure' over a peasant society, which, among other things, organizes and stabilizes the use of force. The question is how far such a superstructure is, as it were, 'organically' integrated with the self-contained village communities and often the level of integration is not high» (pp. 142-3).

This problem of integration the local non-tribal political institutions were unable to solve satisfactorily; and the secondary role played by the quite large Kurdish population in the history of the Middle East may to considerable extent be related to this failure.

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The *taife* in turn is frequently divided into sub-sections called *thia* (branch), though in many contexts the two terms appear to be interchangeable. The *Millashorifi* *taife* referred to before are for instance subdivided into three *thia* each group claiming descent from one of the sons of *Walla Sherif*. These sons (I did not obtain their names) are supposed to have settled respectively in *Imaga*, *Salala* and *Surt*, and these villages remain the centres of their respective *thia* to the present day. Thus the *Agba* of *Surt* is considered of a number of villages by virtue of the fact that he is head of his *thia*. The *Shorifi* *taife* is similarly subdivided into three *thia*, the names being given to us as *Walla Agba*, *Walla Sherif* and *Walla Shorifi* *Agba* - these being presumably the names of the ancestral founders of the lineage. On the other hand some persons at least did not seem to be clearly aware of this subdivision and on being asked the name of their *thia* would reply "Shorifi". However I was assured by one informant that there is no difference between *taife* and *thia*, but that the one is bigger than the other. This is I think an accurate description. *Thia* is a type of kinship group fairly frequently encountered by anthropologists. Locally termed lineage, but more aptly described by Firth as *clan*, it differs only from the clan group in scale and political cohesion. With the loosening of political ties the distinction between the two types of grouping tends to disappear. The *Agba* of *Surt* for instance claimed to be that he was head of his own *taife* and as such of equal rank to *Walla Sherif* *Agba* of *Salala*. *Walla Sherif* of course did not admit this claim but maintained that *Walla Sherif*, *Agba* of *Surt* was his subject.

From this description and the examples quoted it is clear that the terms *subject*, *taife* and *thia* fall into the normal anthropological classifications of *tribe*, *clan* and *lineage* (*clan*), with the slight anomaly that the *clan* are in this case exogenous, or largely so.

Sub-sections of Land Tenure

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The settlements for the most part consist of small villages (*gad*) scattered along the valleys. The term *gad* really includes both the houses and the cultivation surrounding them and may at times prove confusing. The *gad* of *Imagaria* for instance contains two houses only, that of *Imagaria* has over a hundred. Every *gad* is the "property" of a *Walla* (*Agba*). If the *Agba* owns only one *gad* as in the case of *Walla Sherif* *Agba* of *Imagaria* he will live in it himself; if

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"The E. J. H. P. - P. 1958 and Appendix to the Detached
Class of a semi-herd community in Southern Nigeria J.E.A.S.

Vol. 14, 114.

E. J. H. P. - No. 10, the *Thiopia* 170, 171.

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It is however that owing to the role of ortho-herd carrying, *Walla* *taife* and *thia* tend to be exogenous rather than endogenous.

happens when the same material facts are considered without an adequate appreciation of the sociological significance of kinship. The following quotations illustrate the position of the Agha as understood by Ray.

The first is reasonable enough:-

- (p. 48) A tribe is a community or federation of communities which exists for the protection of its members against external aggression and for the maintenance of the old racial customs and standards of life. Some tribes have no recognized chiefs some have many.

The second is more hypothetical:-

- (p. 45/46) The position of the chief varies greatly in different tribes. In the former instance, though granted the most ungrudging obedience, he is distinctly one of the tribesmen, the leading member of a family which has won its leadership through military prowess. Lower down he often belongs to an entirely separate caste, and comes from a different stock to the tribesmen. The large tribes are divided into sections, and in different tribes we find many sections with the same name. This points to the fact that the sections represent the original source of the tribe, while the present chiefs belong to powerful families who have invaded their domains and seized their lands. This is notably the case with the Hani where nearly all the land belongs to one powerful family, against which a few old tribal Aghas and headmen still maintain an unequal struggle. Here the chief is a landlord, and the system that prevails is feudal rather than tribal.

The statement that in the foothill and plains area the Aghas are frequently of different stock to their villagers is valid and has already been commented upon in Chapter I. The idea that the Aghas "represent the original source of the soil", while the permanent tribal Aghas are comparing overblown to mere fantasy, while as for the Hani the facts seem to be that the tribe itself is "all one family" (taifa) while the land is mostly held by two dwelling lineages who have no kinship affiliations with the Hani at all. While this lineage distinction between Agha and tenant is valid for the plains area, it does not apply to the tribal districts. The following for instance is quite accurate:-

- (Ray, p. 42) In the bigger tribes the Aghas, whose families have for many generations been entirely dissociated from manual labour, are of a far finer type than the peasants.

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8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

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Such generalizations may lead to some startling sociological conclusions:-

(p. 221) This village (Merga; Map 2) lies just below Sheikh Muhammad Agha's residence (Balash) in the Balik country, and its inhabitants, some fifty families in number, are nearly all his relations. Being of 'chiefly' descent they consider it beneath their dignity to cultivate the soil; they have therefore only two means of livelihood, sponging on Sheikh Muhammad Agha who pays them most of his salary to keep them quiet, and looting and taking toll from the caravans that pass along the Persian Road.

This paragraph I consider most illuminating. For it is precisely on the basis of such evidence that the British policy of 'military pacification' is carried out on all the outlying frontiers of Empire. The tribesmen just beyond the border are always, it seems, "desperate bandits and brigands" intent on plundering the innocent peasantry within the jurisdiction of the British raj. Ray of course does not intentionally deceive. He had only seen Merga from afar and was merely recording the position as outlined to him by Sheikh Muhammad. In giving this account however Sheikh Muhammad was fairly obviously black-mailing the British Administrator for more money, and was probably himself responsible for the particular piece of brigandage complained of. Merga today has one of the most extensive cultivations of the whole district, and is considered a prosperous village. There seems no reason to suppose that the position was radically different in 1920, even though the ravages of war had temporarily disorganised the agricultural arrangements of the whole area.

This is not special pleading on behalf of the villagers of Merga or of the Kurds in general, but it is time that their nefarious activities were seen in proper proportion. It must be admitted that prior to the establishment of an external Authority most Kurdish tribes freely resorted to brigandage on every possible occasion. It was a socially approved aspect of inter-tribal life and one upon which the Kurds themselves lay great emphasis in folk tale and tradition. But it is this very emphasis that has led to the fabulous distortions that appear in all accounts of Kurdish life either lay or official. To read the literature one must suppose that in former times the majority of Kurdish communities lived solely on the proceeds of plunder and ransom; and while the Government continues its present policy of cultural suppression such fallacies are obviously convenient. But the unbiased observer cannot avoid the conclusion that most of the more spectacular exploits of Kurdish brigandage are products of the Kurds' own imagination. Seen in their proper scale these warlike activities can never have been more than an exciting gloss upon the normal balanced cycle of agricultural economics.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 Mall Kurd Mall
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622 landlord of the soil - by which title he receives rent, and he supports the village Guest House. As we shall see later these two functions are closely interrelated.

000 Social Organization Areas other than Balik

As explained earlier my information for groups other than the Balik must be treated with reserve. The following notes may however prove of value to further students of the area.

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177 Area B. It would appear that the tribes of this area such as the Shurdi and the Khushman were originally organized on much the same lines as described above but that owing to their relatively long period of contact with an external administration the social forms have now become blurred. The general tendency seems to be for the land to become the property of absentee landlords having no kinship relation with their tenants. The villages moreover lack the clan homogeneity noticeable among the Balik.

621 Area C. Mention has already been made of the primitive settled tribes of this area, the Hsai and the Girdi. With the Hsai as recorded by Ray the organization is feudal rather than tribal, since the village Aghas are not of the same kin group as their tenants. I was told that "all the Hsai call each other *amur*" implying, if true, that the whole tribe consists of one *taifa* only. With the Girdi the position appears to be somewhat different. Jamil Agha, their paramount chief, is himself a Girdi but is a townsman in habit and holds himself very much aloof from his followers.

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312 In its technological aspects the plains culture differs markedly from that of the hills, especially as regards housebuilding and agricultural equipment. An important ecological difference is that, owing to the limited water supply, the position of the village sites is determined and limited by the occurrence of water holes, and the villages in consequence are larger than those found in the hills. From the size of the surrounding country and from archaeological considerations it would appear that some such sites (habitas for instance) have been in continuous occupation for several thousand years.

The *Habitas*

621 Though my information is extremely scanty the indications are that the social organization of tribes such as the Shurdi differs in many respects from that of the settled tribes. In terminology the term *habita* appears to correspond to *subtribe* and *hail* to *taifa* but the identity may not be exact. The term *hala* corresponds to *gund* and implies a small settlement of *taifa* in one location. This last term is also used by the settled peoples. Thus among the Shurdi

8: Leach E-S (1958) 1940 HALL KURD HALL
Rowland

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of Balis the people leave their villages during the hot months of the summer and live in tents instead. This was the case when I visited all Agas of Baget. Baget on this occasion had as a matter of fact divided into two separate huts one under the Aga himself and the other under his brother, both were located within a mile or so of the deserted village. During the season, I was told, the huts are small in size, each group consisting merely of a single extended family (e.g. Father, brothers, sons and dependents). Although in the course of their annual migration the Kurdi spread out over a wide area the whole group of "more than 2000 tents" are directly controlled by a single paramount chief, Pottah Aga i Kurdi. According to my informants the Kurdi own over a million sheep and some 25,000 cattle but the Kurdi are notoriously fond of large fighens. A certain characteristic of the Kurdi appears to be their extreme hardness. They live in their black tents throughout the winter and I was told numerous incredible tales of the astonishing rigours and privations they are said to put up with. They appeared in fact to have an almost legendary quality even for the entitled peoples through whom land they pass.

is clear then, and that the economy of the village will not stand the strain.

Such point is lost to this by the fact that all signs of capital (and of the market), the being a central characteristic of Smith's economic system, is absent. The village, however, has received a simple letter out with the intention towards capitalization. However, far from leaving the new order to come to find the present time extremely prosperous and is eagerly proving his claims with the government to have the market last registered in his own name, so that he can establish his people's claim to be an exhibitor in their own right instead of merely a trade of the market. It seems significant too that the market, the claim have never had to undergo the economic shock of temporary government support, appear to be today with the most integrated group in the anthropological sense.

The further generalization emerges from this analysis. In order earlier that of the food consumed by the village, the only item that must be produced by each are sugar, tea, coffee and in some cases rice. In total further that practically the whole of this expenditure was incurred by the signs in connection with the maintenance of the heart lines and his own household. The first our analysis of other forms of cash expenditure we see that these too fall almost exclusively on the signs rather than the common. The signs's expenditure thus differs from that of the common not only in value but also very largely in kind. This distinction has important bearings for our further analysis.

• Economic Balance of the Village Community

If the various village groups in the area have functioned it is scarcely possible to select any single community as typical, so far as agricultural production is concerned. While all the groups are involved in approximately the same range of products, what might be called the 'emphasis of production' varies considerably. The village may specialize in fruit growing, another in wheat, another in tobacco and so on. This differentiation arises partly from geographical considerations - such as climate, water supply, soil fertility - and partly from the conservative practices of the signs concerned. Being in the advanced trading contacts opened up since the coming of the road, and the need to collect easily developed wants for imported "luxury" goods the whole structure of the economic organization of these hill people is undergoing very rapid change and readjustment. The individual variations as between different villages at the present time depend in the main upon the degree to which this readjustment to changed external circumstances has already taken place. It should be borne in mind therefore that the synthetic account of this process of change in the following few pages, though valid in general terms if applied to the district as a whole, is not necessarily applicable to any single village community.

Less. The land potentially available for "wheat cultivation"
is roughly speaking all the arable land that can be effectively
irrigated - the extent being limited both by the configuration of the
land and the available water supply. Here immediately there are
complications. The irrigation system as at present arranged may serve
a number of purposes

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1. Irrigation of rice cultivation - which in most villages
appear to be a personal plot pertaining to the Agha alone
and not a tenant's holding in the ordinary sense.
2. Partial irrigation of the vegetable gardens. In any re-
organization this would have to be maintained.
3. Partial irrigation of existing tobacco areas.
4. In some villages (e.g. Ingala) for detouring the mill, which
is used either by the Agha himself or a near relative.

Any reorganization of such a system would affect a number of
different individuals whose immediate interests may be directly
conflicting. The Agha for instance is hardly likely to abandon his
rice plot which is his personal property merely to provide his tenants
with more water to grow tobacco; but on the other hand if he renounces
the whole of the tobacco cultivation for himself the tenants whose land
is watered with will have a justifiable grievance. It might well
be found in fact that in any particular village the rearrangement of
the water supply as so to provide a greater tobacco acreage would in
practice involve a completely new allocation of land holdings to all
the inhabitants, a reform which would certainly be very difficult to
carry out. It may be significant that at least where such a re-
organization of cultivation has in fact been brought about the
Iraqi tenants were not averse to the district and there was no old
established system of tenancy rights supported by an ancestral
tradition.

A further question of interest is the problem of "marginal"
land. It is true that the land configuration, somewhat similar to
that of the Alpine villages of the Basque District, sets a definite
limit to the area that can be cultivated, but on the other hand there
seem to be a number of small marginal areas, at present under scrub,
which might be brought into cultivation if the available water were
very efficiently utilized and the cash incentive were sufficient to
reap the extra labour involved. The "rights" over such marginal
land rest at present exclusively with the Agha.

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Labour. The labour available is the labour of the tenant
couple and their families; it would seem that the cultivation of
tobacco for example would affect the labour rather than the volume of
work required. Under the present system the wheat harvest comes in

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8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MAIL Kurd MAIL
Rowanduz

by detatched State from the National area. Similar industrial developments further north would provide a labour market for the State of the Hill area. Historically the cheapest labour is that which is least organized. Once again the analogy with South African developments is very close.

Economic relations within the Village

The previous section dealt primarily with the economic relationships between the village group and the outside world, and the way in which changes in the form of this external contact may be expected to affect the basic economic organization of village life. It is now necessary to consider the same set of phenomena from the point of view of the individual rather than of the village group as a whole.

In general the activities for exchange within the village group are to be regarded as social rather than economic. The system of collection by family groups rather than individuals ensures that there is no great differentiation of economic status as between different communities, and trading contacts within the group are scarcely necessary.

Cattle

An exception to this is the case of the weaver who occupies a specialist position by virtue of his trade. It should be noted that reeling and spinning are not specialist occupations. For the most part the wool is prepared and spun independently by the women of each household. The material is then washed up into cloth by the weaver in return for payment either in cash or kind.

Another individual sometimes occupying a specialist position is the herdsman. Both in Baluch and Bengali the whole flock of goats and sheep was in charge of a single individual who apparently lived permanently in the open with his charges. It was explained to me that the herdsman was not a member of the village but a stranger, the various families despatching to him their stock collectively to his support. Though the flocks are thus herded together there is no suggestion of 'joint ownership', each man knows his own stock, this fact being easily demonstrated at milking time every morning and evening when the herdsman goes out to the grazing and picks out their own particular property. In other village conditions are rather different. For instance the Bedouins of Egypt have large herds, and so stated already part of the community separates off during the summer to form an independent tribe, which tends to the cattle exclusively. I have no

* This idealizes the existing conditions. It is valid for Bengali but even of the other villagers are here no weaver of their own. The men still carry all their Bedouin cloth, but the spinning and weaving is largely concentrated in females and tribal.

Land Scarcity, House Construction and Mobility

31 The indications are that land resources are for the most part as
fully utilized as present technical equipment permits; the amount of
631 unused land that could be brought into cultivation merely by an
increase in manual labor is small. Except in the mountainous
country above Hailan where conditions are too severe, almost everywhere
the land is sufficiently level to work a plough, and where
shelter permits subsidiary cultivation such as vines are carried far up
into the steep hill faces. There is clear evidence that the food
supplies grown are only barely adequate for the needs of the community in
any but the best years; that the existing population approaches to the
maximum that can be supported by the present economic system.

861 Land scarcity may well be the most plausible explanation for the
very curious form of architecture adopted in this region. The villages
are always constructed on a steep hill which could have no possible
392 agricultural utility. They are not constructed at the top of the hill
as defense considerations might seem to suggest but on the side of it
• 621 immediately above the level plough land at the bottom of the valley.
812 Houses as at Hailan and at Haput the houses are clustered together in
as close solid blocks elsewhere they are grouped into a number of
individual clusters, the situation of these village structures seeming to
have some correlation with the degree of mobility within the village
as can be seen from paragraph 10. The house in a particular cluster
are frequently built one above the other in a series of terraces so that
the roof of one house forms the front porch of the one below. The house
block shown in the photograph was occupied by two brothers and their
families. These occupied the two top buildings. The bottom building
though also originally a dwelling house was at the time of my visit being
used as a store house for both families. All this is exceptional
even a single block of buildings such as this is usually found to be
occupied by a group of near relatives functioning for the most part as a
joint economic group. In view of the extreme conservatism of such
close groups it would hardly be surprising. If however economic
development of the future tend to erode the rights of the
individual as opposed to those of the kinship group we may expect the
concomitant development of a more individualistic style of archi-
tecture. In the other hand the existing type of joint dwelling house is
a factor which magnifies any effort on the part of the State to
recognize the system of land tenure and cultivation as those of greater
efficiency.

861 On my recent passage that to the place where the whole
392 agricultural system is upon wheat production and where the introduction
of water supply actually affect the whole economic organization of the
community, not only the arrangement of the villages but the actual
technological construction of the houses is totally different from that
of the hill districts. But this applies only to the villages of the

11 October 1958 [Dubai]

THE KURDISH REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD

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The Kurds were repulsed, however, in an attack on the Mah-madabad Pass near Saqqiz, designed to cut the Senasidaj Road, and again later after they had seized the hills overlooking Saqqiz. The Iranian army drove them off and erected round watch-towers of mud on the summits, each manned by thirty or forty soldiers. Finally a truce was effected whereby liaison officers were ex-changed,* each side was to stay within its lines, and the Kurds were to have the right to inspect vehicles going from Saqqiz to Banah and Sardasht and so stop arms and ammunition from reaching the Iranian garrisons there. The Shikak and the Herti returned to the north.

CHARACTER OF QALI MOHAMMAD AND THE
KURDISH REPUBLIC

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After this period of conflict, Qali Mohammad drew aside his iron curtain and gave non-Soviet observers a chance to look at his country. Although feeling against the British on account of the expulsion of the Basmala from Iraq, Soviet-sponsored anti-British propaganda, and certain events in the past in which the Kurds considered they had been victims of British opportunism, was too strong to permit them to visit the tiny Kurdish Republic, at various times four Americans and one Frenchman were guests of Qali Mohammad.

These observers found the Kurdish Republic to be a going con-cern. Although destitute of any legal basis whatsoever, Qali Mohammad's *de facto* government continued as before, changing only the title of its ministers from *wazir* (ministers) to *reis* (chief).
Qali Mohammad himself became merely the leader of the party (Pishwa-i-Habshi-Dimokraw-i-Kurd). The villages were run by their old landlords and tribal leaders with the aid of a gendarmes locally recruited and dressed in Kurdish costume, but com-manded by officers from Mahabad with Soviet uniforms. Maha-bad itself, from a typically drab Persian provincial town, had become picturesque and colorful, its streets thronging with Kurds in national costume, free for the moment of the hard Iranian soldiers and gendarmes.

*The Kurdish liaison officer was "Colonel" Mohammad Karamadish, one of the original founders of the Republic, later killed when the Iranian army pushed it north to the Soviet border.

536 square yard of uncultivated ground around
 557 the town is used for this game. Those
 who cannot find space in other parts run
 up and down the streets playing football.

• 621 The social system of the Kurds is
 622 essentially feudal. Up to recent times no
 623 man could prosper or even feel safe un-
 624 der the protection of a powerful agha,
 625 whose armed retainers guarded the mudia
 626 (serfs) from any who might attempt to
 627 tyrannize the village. In return for this
 the agha exercised an overlordship, col-
 lecting a percentage of the crops, a fee for
 marriages, and other taxes. He called
 out the villagers to fight an enemy when
 required, and was generally in the position
 of a feudal baron of ancient England.

An agha used his family as the basis of
 his power. He produced as many sons as
 possible, who would be loyal to him in an
 emergency, and put each in charge of a
 village, or group of villages, to assist them
 in the common cause when necessary. If
 sufficiently powerful he might bring other
 villages under his control by the simple
 expedient of assuring them from his
 powerful protection. Thus in many Kur-
 dish tribes there is no blood relationship
 between the aghas and the mudias, but the
 aghas are of a common descent.

721 Another important feature in the social
 722 system is the shakhs. Among the Arabs
 723 the term 'shakhs' signifies a tribal chief
 but in Kurdistan a shakhs is a holy man.
 Certain shakhs families have acquired
 the title because they claim descent from
 the Prophet Mohammed, in which case it
 corresponds to the title of *sayid* among
 other Mohammedan peoples; other shakhs
 are holy men, but do not claim such
 ancestry. Not uncommonly the former
 class is the more influential and powerful.

It is unfortunate that a number of the
 shakhs have not connected themselves
 with the religious welfare of the people.
 Like the priests elsewhere throughout the
 world, they have so often used religious
 influence to increase material power, and
 become analogous to powerful tribal

- 732 Quite understand how men born and bred
in this village under the eye of their sheikh
719 could not but regard him as possessing
superhuman powers.
- 621 In modern Iraq the power of the sheikh
and agha has been curtailed. The
624 villager still works under his agha as the
owner of the land—the only one, in fact,
732 who is competent to organize and super-
vise the work of the village; but the
simplest villager now realizes that all the
power of his agha or business of his sheikh
will avail him. He should be amply in-
fused to act contrary to the law.
- 100 Certain individual Iraqis who cannot
claim tribal ancestry talk glibly of "break-
ing up the tribes" and "exterminating the
aghaz" as has been done in some other
countries, but on the whole the Iraq
government treats the matter with greater
strength and seeks mainly to "break" those
chiefs who use their influence against the
government.